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SUBMERGED INDEPENDENT AGENCIES
Brian D. Feinstein and Jennifer Nou*
Independent agencies are in the judicial crosshairs. Scholars criticize their
efficacy—while still puzzling over how to define the form. By and large, this attention
focuses on the top of the agency hierarchy, the extent to which agency heads are
insulated from presidential control. What this perspective misses, however, is that
power is also exercised by tenure-protected civil servants below. This phenomenon
exists not because Congress has delegated them authority, but because executive
branch actors have. Consequently, there exists another species of independent agency
that requires a reckoning: call them “submerged independent agencies.” These
entities are “agencies” because they wield discretionary governmental authority.
They are “independent” because they are headed by career staff removable only for
cause. And they are “submerged” in that they are relatively unknown to scholars,
judges, and sometimes even agency heads themselves.
This Article introduces the concept of submerged independent agencies, sheds
light on their scope, and reflects upon the resulting normative implications. Using over
forty years of data drawn from the Federal Register, the analysis reveals that when
political appointees delegate their statutory authority, the majority of these powers go
to civil servants rather than fellow appointees. This behavior appears to be driven by
strategic political considerations. Most notably, subdelegations to civil servants in
executive agencies occur more frequently during the midnight period before a
presidential transition — perhaps indicating an effort to entrench preferences. In
addition, subdelegation may be less common during periods of divided party control
between the presidency and House. This behavior may reflect an attempt to avoid
provoking congressional ire by reassigning powers that Congress had bestowed on
others.
*

Assistant Professor, The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania; Professor of Law,
University of Chicago Law School, respectively. For helpful comments and conversations, thanks to
Robert Glicksman, Daniel Hemel, William Howell, William Hubbard, Aziz Huq, Christine Jolls, Hal
Krent, Jonathan Masur, Gillian Metzger, Michael Morse, Donald Moynihan, Richard Murphy, Anne
O’Connell, Nick Parrillo, Jon Rogowski, Roberta Romano, Susan Rose-Ackerman, Ruth Bloch Rubin,
and David Strauss [more acknowledgments to come]. Thanks also to participants in the C. Boyden Gray
Center’s Agency Independence Roundtablee; AALS Conversations on the Administrative State series;
University of Chicago American Politics workshop and Law School Works-in-Progress workshop; and
Yale’s Law, Economics, and Organization workshop. Thanks also to Courtney Butterworth, Michael
Christ, Conor Ferrall, David Lamb, James Morrison, Abraham Moussako, Jacob Pavlecic, Jason Petty,
Jessica Trafimow, Daniel Wang, and Jessica Yuan for excellent research assistance. The authors
acknowledge the Gray Center’s generous financial support of this research.

1

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4023822

These findings raise several legal and normative concerns. Many submerged
independent agencies are vulnerable to constitutional challenge and raise difficult
statutory questions. Whether the phenomenon is ultimately desirable for the
administrative state is an open, empirical question. On the one hand, subdelegations
raise the prospect of agency burrowing and entrenchment, and thus diminish political
accountability. On the other hand, they can foster expertise and reduce ossification by
dispersing decision-making authority within an agency. Accordingly, we consider
various institutional mechanisms to help political actors navigate these tradeoffs, such
as processes for reviewing actions taken pursuant to delegated authority; regular
sunsets of such authority; and a more robust process of revisiting subdelegations
during presidential transitions.
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INTRODUCTION
Debates about agency independence focus on agency heads: the secretaries,
administrators, commissioners, and board members that lead the federal bureaucracy.
The central question is whether individuals in those positions can be removed by the
President at will or only for cause. In other words, can the President dismiss an
agency’s leader for any reason at all, or do statutes require him to furnish one? If the
former, then some consider the agency to be “executive” in nature, while the latter
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renders the agency “independent.”1 The basic idea is that when top personnel serve at
the President’s pleasure, executive control over that agency is at its height. By contrast,
when Congress limits the President’s ability to fire, it seeks to shield the agency from
presidential influence.
Some have pushed back on this “binary” view of agencies, however, to insist
that agency independence is instead a matter of degree.2 From this perspective, what
matters are not removal restrictions in isolation, but rather a number of factors bearing
on the President’s ability to dictate policy. Think, for example, of multimember
structures, partisan balancing requirements, or specified terms of tenure. The more
robust each of these features are, the more difficult it is for the White House to call the
shots. More effort, that is, is required to convince many agency heads instead of one;
to convince those from a different party; and to remove someone entitled to a definite
term. Because agencies possess these individual features to varying degrees, agency
independence must be understood along a spectrum.3
Note that this perspective also looks to the top of the administrative hierarchy.
This focus is understandable given that Congress typically grants final decisionmaking authority to agency heads. But the buck does not always stop with secretaries
and commissioners. 4 Rather, these leaders often relinquish their decision-making
authority to their subordinates. In other words, they subdelegate their power — not
only to fellow political appointees, but often to tenure-protected career staff.5 These
subdelegations are sometimes legally enforceable, but even when they are not, norms

See Jacob Gersen, Designing Agencies, in DANIEL FARBER & ANNE JOSEPH O’CONNELL EDS.,
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 333, 347 (2010) (“Independence is a legal
term of art in public law, referring to agencies headed by officials that the President may not remove
without cause. Such agencies are, by definition, independent agencies; all other agencies are not.”).
2
See Kirti Datla & Richard Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and Executive Agencies),
98 CORNELL L. REV. 769 (2013). See also Rachel Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture
Through Institutional Design, 89 TEXAS L. REV. 15 (2010); Aziz Z. Huq, Removal as a Political
Question, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1, 6 (2013) Geoffrey Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 41
(1986); David Lewis & Jennifer Selin, Political Control and the Forms of Agency Independence, 83
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1487, 1504-5 (2015); Jennifer Selin, What Makes An Agency Independent? 59 AM.
J. POL. SCI. 971 (2015). Judges have also made similar observations. See, e.g., See Free Enter. Fund v.
Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 547 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that agency
independence depended on a number of factors, including its separate budgeting and litigating authority
and, “above all, a political environment, reflecting tradition and function, that would impose a heavy
political cost” upon a President seeking to remove without cause).
3
See sources cited supra note 2.
4
See Daniel Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Lost World of Administrative Law, 92 TEX. L. REV.
1137, 1150, 1160 (2014) (challenging the conventional wisdom that considers agency heads as the
“presumed decision makers” and sees administrative power placed in the hands of a “fixed cast of
players”).
5
See Jennifer Nou, Subdelegating Powers, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 473 (2017). As used here, the term
“subdelegation” refers only to internal delegations within agencies. We do not explore the distinct but
related phenomenon in which the President delegates statutorily-granted authority to various agency
heads or when Congress delegates to internal units within a conventional agency.
1
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and resource constraints often result in final, discretionary authority below.6 And these
delegations to civil servants, as this Article will show, are more common than
previously understood.
Not only are such delegations pervasive, but they are also often substantial in
scope. They are decidedly not garden-variety requests to fetch coffee and make copies,
figuratively speaking, but rather decisions that affect third parties’ legal rights and
obligations. Take, for example, the Administrator of the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (NHTSA)’s decision to assign rulemaking authority to a
careerist associate administrator.7 The action gave the civil servant the authority “to
exercise the powers and perform the duties of the Administrator” to “issue motor
vehicle safety and theft prevention standards” as well as “average fuel economy
standards.” 8 Notably, the NHTSA Administrator reserved the authority to issue,
amend, or revoke final rules concerning safety and fuel-economy standards,9 but did
not do so for theft-prevention standards.10
Accordingly, NHTSA’s Associate Administrator for Rulemaking — again, a
tenure-protected civil servant — has made consequential use of this delegated
authority. In recent years, the Associate Administrator has invoked it to grant
exemptions to automakers from a theft-prevention regulation; 11 issued notices of
proposed rulemakings concerning fuel-economy calculations and safety standards;12
and delayed, for a year or more, the effective date of more rigorous safety regulations
6

Id.
50 Fed. Reg. 7345-01 (Feb. 22, 1985); see also U.S. SENATE COMM. ON GOV’T AFFAIRS, POLICY AND
SUPPORTING POSITIONS 150-51 (1984) (identifying the administrator and associate administrator for
rulemaking as, respectively, a presidential appointment and career appointment).
8
Id. (codified at 49 CFR § 501.8)
9
Id. (citing 49 CFR § 501.7 (providing these exemptions for the issuance, amendment or revocation of
rules under, most notably, 49 U.S.C. chs. 301 (safety) and 329 (fuel economy))).
10
See 49 CFR § 501.7 (not mentioning theft-prevention or 49 U.S.C. ch. 331 among the administrator’s
reservations of authority). The version of 49 CFR § 501.7 in effect at the time of the 1985 subdelegation
contained
a
substantial
similar
list
of
reservations
of
authority,
see
https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015023113296&view=1up&seq=41&skin=2021.
11
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/08/12/2020-17596/petitions-for-exemption-fromthe-federal-motor-vehicle-theft-prevention-standard;
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/05/11/2020-10028/petitions-for-exemption-fromthe-federal-motor-vehicle-theft-prevention-standard;
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2013/04/09/2013-08225/petition-for-exemption-from-thevehicle-theft-prevention-standard-bmw-of-north-america-llc
12
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2005/08/30/05-17006/average-fuel-economy-standardsfor-light-trucks-model-years-2008-2011
(fuel
economy);
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2002/12/16/02-31522/light-truck-average-fuel-economystandards-model-years-2005-07
(fuel
economy);
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2005/08/23/05-16661/federal-motor-vehicle-safetystandards-roof-crush-resistance
(roof
safety);
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/02/28/2019-03181/federal-motor-vehicle-safetystandards-electric-powered-vehicles-electrolyte-spillage-and-electrical (post-crash electric shock
prevention in electric cars); https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-1994-07-08/html/94-16493.htm
(anti-theft).
7
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concerning many auto parts. 13 Indeed, the Associate Administrator’s website takes
public credit for the agency’s actions, stating that the careerist’s “office is responsible
for setting the nation’s vehicle safety standards, fuel economy regulations, anti-theft
and consumer information regulations.”14
Consider another high-profile devolution of authority that has been in place for
over twenty years. In 1990, Congress instructed the Secretary of Health and Human
Services (HHS) to issue a recall upon finding that a medical device “would cause
serious adverse health consequences.”15 The Secretary promulgated a rule delegating
this authority to the Food & Drug Administration (FDA) Commissioner,16 who then
passed that final decision-making authority down in 2001 to sixteen separate FDA
career executives, all directors and deputy directors of various FDA offices and
centers. 17 Many of the resulting recalls have been high-profile and controversial.18
More broadly, a recent study found that career employees issued “almost all” of the
1,889 FDA rules published from 2001 to 2018.19 In other words, virtually every final
rule issued by the FDA over an almost twenty-year period was signed by a civil
servant. Indeed, we find that FDA is the agency with the most published
subdelegations in our dataset.
Multimember commissions devolve their authority too, though the dynamics
can be more complex, especially with partisan balancing requirements. In 2011, for
example, a Democratic-dominated Federal Communications Commission delegated
authority to its Wireless Telecommunication Bureau (WTB) — headed by a career
executive — to resolve disputes arising out of a rule governing domestic data

13

See, e.g., https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2008/08/28/E8-19837/federal-motor-vehiclesafety-standards-lamps-reflective-devices-and-associated-equipment
(headlights);
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2006/12/13/E6-21207/federal-motor-vehicle-safetystandards-brake-hoses (brake parts); https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2004/03/12/045691/federal-motor-vehicle-safety-standards-bus-emergency-exits-and-window-retention-and-release
(bus emergency exits).
14
Ryan Posten, NHTSA Leadership, https://www.nhtsa.gov/nhtsa-leadership/ryan-posten
15
Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990, § 8; 21 U.S.C. § 360h(e).
16
61 Fed. Reg. 59004-01 (Nov. 20, 1996).
17
66 Fed. Reg. 30992-01 (June 5, 2001). These officials include the Director and Deputy Director for
the Office of Compliance and the Director and Deputy Directors of the Center for Biologics
Evaluation and Research, among other similarly situated officials.
18
See, e.g., Heart Device Parts Recalled, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2011),
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/16/business/fda-recalls-faulty-leads-in-heartdevice.html?searchResultPosition=1 (recalling a defibrillator implanted in approximately 79,000
patients); Denise Grady, Riddled With Metal by Mistake in a Study, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2011),
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/22/health/22breast.html (FDA approves a temporary silicone breast
implant following an abbreviated test period, then issues a recall due to metal fragments being left in
breast tissue, and is subject to heavy criticism).
19
See ANGELA ERICKSON & THOMAS BERRY, BUT WHO RULES AND RULEMAKERS: A STUDY OF
ILLEGALLY
ISSUED
REGULATIONS
AT
HHS
20
(2019),
available
at
https://pd.pacificlegal.org/HHSReport.
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roaming.20 The delegation was made after a 3-2 vote along party lines.21 Three years
later, the head of the WTB granted a petition in favor of T-Mobile’s interpretation of
the rule with which the sitting Republican commissioners disagreed.22 The Republican
commissioners publicly called on the chair to bring the matter to a full commission
vote, which never occurred.23 One of the commissioners protested that he “didn’t just
go through the confirmation process in order to have bureaus and advisory committees
make decisions that should be made by Commissioners.” 24 Notwithstanding the
commissioner’s complaint, the WTB’s decision stands.25
Examples like these reflect a bureaucracy overseen by civil servants and
hidden in plain sight. It hums along even when the agency is beset by vacancies at the
top or otherwise helmed by acting officials.26 Even when presidentially-appointed,
Senate-confirmed officials are in place, some are unaware that subdelegated authority
is even being exercised below.27 In his advice to new commissioners, for example, a
former commissioner of the Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) told of his
experience: “from time to time, you might read in a newspaper about a ‘Commission
action,’ and you will have no idea what it is about.”28 That is often because “the staff
ha[s] taken action pursuant to the more than 376 separate rules where the Commission
previously granted delegated authority to the SEC staff.” 29 His tone of resignation
reflects not only the magnitude of subdelegated authorities, but also the costs of
learning about them.
Notably, the subdelegations studied here are created through relatively
entrenched grants of power by executive actors. First, they are sticky because they are
published in the Federal Register and then codified in the Code of Federal Regulations
(CFR). The Federal Register is the federal government’s official daily publication for
rules, including the internal rules of agency practice and procedure delegating
authorities.30 The CFR, in turn, is the government’s “codification of the general and

20

Roaming Order (2011), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-11-52A1_Rcd.pdf
Id.
22
See In the Matter of Reexamination of Roaming Obligations of Com. Mobile Radio Serv. Providers
& Other Providers of Mobile Data Servs., 29 F.C.C. Rcd. 15483, 15485–86 ¶7 (2014).
23
https://www.fcc.gov/document/comms-pai-and-orielly-joint-stmt-abuse-delegated-authority
[https://perma.cc/K9XR-RR9E]
24
Id.
25
https://perma.cc/G4LX-BQUZ (last updated June 6, 2019).
26
See Anne Joseph O’Connell, Actings, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 613 (2020).
27
See infra
28
Luis Aguilar, Commissioner Aguilar’s (Hopefully) Helpful Tips for New SEC Commissioners (Nov.
30, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/helpful-tips-for-new-sec-commissioners.html.
29
Id.
30
Federal Register, 1936-present, https://www.govinfo.gov/help/fr#about (describing the Federal
Register as “the official daily publication for rules, proposed rules, and notices of Federal agencies and
organizations, as well as executive orders and other presidential documents”).
21

6

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4023822

permanent rules published in the Federal Register.”31 Both are highly formal venues
that require attention to drafting conventions and review by the Office of Federal
Register. 32 Second, as we will show, executive actors often issue subdelegations
during the midnight period before a presidential transition; as a result, reversal can be
costly for new administrations given their competing priorities and steep learning
curves. Finally, these delegations can also become functionally entrenched as various
interests coalesce around them.33 Indeed, our study reveals that, once granted, these
more formal delegations are rarely revoked.34
As such, there exists another species of independent agency that demands a
reckoning. Call these submerged independent agencies. Submerged independent
agencies are headed by civil servants that exercise authority originally delegated by
Congress. They are “agencies” under almost any definition of the term: their heads
exercise discretionary governmental authority.35 As a result, there are often elaborate
bureaucracies that arise to support this decision-making. 36 And these agencies are
“independent” under either the binary or non-binary view: They are headed by tenureprotected officials. They also exist on a spectrum featuring heads with varying degrees
of independence, from members of the Senior Executive Service to lower-level career
staff. 37 Finally, these agencies exist below the surface, in that they are relatively
unknown to the scholarly literature and the public more broadly. As mentioned,
sometimes they are even unknown to political appointees themselves.38
This Article introduces the concept of submerged independent agencies, sheds
light on their scope, and reflects upon the resulting normative implications. Previous
scholarship on subdelegations draws on disjointed examples to paint an incomplete
picture of the phenomenon, while some of the legal analyses are already outdated.39
Code of Federal Regulations, https://www.govinfo.gov/app/collection/cfr/ (“The Code of Federal
Regulations (CFR) annual edition is the codification of the general and permanent rules published in
the Federal Register by the departments and agencies of the Federal Government.”).
32
Office of the Federal Register, Document Drafting Handbook, https://www.archives.gov/federalregister/write/handbook
33
See infra
34
See infra
35
See infra Part II.B.
36
The Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research, for example, has numerous offices and staff that
rival more familiar organizational charts at agencies like the Food, Drug Administration, of which it is
a part. See https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/center-biologics-evaluation-and-research-cber/centerbiologics-evaluation-and-research
37
Schedule C. See infra Part II.A.
38
See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
39
See Elizabeth Magill, Agency Self-Regulation, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 859, 898 (2009); Nou, supra
note 5. Previous legal scholarship, for example, has examined questions of statutory interpretation:
whether Congress explicitly permitted the delegation and, if not, how to understand legislative silence
or ambiguity. See, e.g., Nathan Grunstein, Subdelegation of Administrative Authority, 13 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 144 (1944) (describing the question “to be probed” as the extent to the question of the extent to
which the power to subdelegate authority may be implied when Congress has not explicitly done so);
Jason Marisam, The Interagency Marketplace, 96 MINN. L. REV. 886, 891 (2012) (noting that “[t]he
question of whether Congress has authorized subdelegation is a matter of statutory interpretation”);
31
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Building on and updating this work, our contributions are both conceptual—
synthesizing themes of agency independence—and empirical. One of its main
advances is to document systematically the extent and nature of subdelegations to civil
servants through a new dataset. This dataset also has the potential to open new lines
of scholarship akin to the decades of work on congressional delegation. Our
descriptive findings, in turn, will likely generate further hypotheses for testing in future
work, some of which is already in progress.40
More broadly, the lens we offer intervenes in several other existing literatures.
For example, it complicates work on the “internal separation-of-powers,” which often
portrays civil servants and political appointees as competitors and rivals. 41 When
appointees grant power to aligned civil servants, especially in midnight periods, these
two groups act in concert to perpetuate an administration’s preferences. In this sense,
these dynamics involve a separation of parties rather than powers. 42 Finally, our
findings further reinforce the descriptive observation that the executive branch is
hardly unitary. While many have noted that the executive branch is a “they” and not
an “it,”43 submerged independent agencies show just how much delegated power civil
servants wield.
The topic is also timely in light of the Trump Administration’s outgoing efforts
to subject these agencies to greater political control.44 President Trump’s executive
order prohibited career staff from authorizing regulations, required that any rules be
signed by a “senior appointee,” only allowed senior appointees to initiate rulemakings,
and prohibited any future subdelegations of sign-off authority to staff. 45 Given its
Note, Subdelegation by Federal Administrative Agencies, 12 STAN. L. REV. 808 (1960). Related issues
are the extent to which the President has an inherent constitutional authority to delegate, or whether the
non-delegation doctrine demands congressional authorization. See Thomas Merrill, Rethinking Article
I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2175 (2004).
Still other scholars have proposed that judicial deference to agency interpretations should only extend
to those signed-off by agency heads, rather than their subordinates. See David Barron & Elena Kagan,
Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 238. In the context of acting officials and
the Vacancies Act, Anne O’Connell explores many of the legal issues arising from delegated authority,
which she argues functions as a “substitute” for acting leaders. See O’Connell, supra note 26, at 658,
682-89. See also Daniel Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, Agencies as Adversaries 1447-50 (2017)
(analyzing subdelegation’s legal issues in context of agencies acting as adversaries).
40
See, e.g., Brian Feinstein & Jennifer Nou, Subdelegation with Partisan Alignment (working draft
finding that political appointees subdelegate to civil servants when preferences align).
41
See Jon Michaels, Of Constitutional Custodians and Regulatory Rivals: An Account of the Old and
New Separation of Powers, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 227, 235 (2016); see also Michaels, Enduring, Evolving,
supra note __; Gillian Metzger, The Interdependent Relationship between Internal and External
Separation of Powers, 59 EMORY L.J. 423 (2010); Katyal, supra note __.
42
Cf. Daryl Levinson & Richard Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311
(2006).
43
See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The Law of "Not Now": When Agencies Defer
Decisions, 103 Geo. L.J. 157, 161 (2014) (the “Executive Branch is a ‘they, not an it,’).
44
See Exec. Order No. 67,631, 84 Fed. Reg. 67,631 (Oct. 21, 2020); Exec. Order 13,979, 86 Fed. Reg.
6813 (Jan. 18, 2021).
45
Exec. Order 13,979, supra note 44.

8

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4023822

lame-duck timing, however, the order seemed more symbolic than substantive and was
revoked about a month later by President Biden. The issue, however, is sure to
reemerge during the next Republican administration. In addition to these hints of
greater presidential scrutiny, private parties have already begun to challenge agency
subdelegations as unconstitutional. 46 Once the extent of the phenomenon is better
known, there is likely to be even more political attention and litigation.
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I introduces the concept of submerged
independent agencies. It situates the idea amidst empirical efforts to define the
“agency” as a meaningful unit of analysis. While such efforts often rely on rule-like
definitions, we offer a functional account grounded in legal theory and doctrine: An
administrative agency is an entity that exercises discretionary governmental authority.
Among other things, this principle helps to answer the question of when subunits
within government should be treated separately. The Part then details our method for
isolating independent agencies using forty years of data drawn from the Federal
Register.
Part II then uses these data to present an empirical portrait of submerged
independent agencies. It begins with the observation that the majority of internal
delegations of governmental authority are grants from political appointees to civil
servants, rather than other appointees. At first glance, the finding is perplexing: why
would decision-makers voluntarily abdicate their power to tenure-protected staff over
whom they have less control? To shed light on this question, we seek to understand
time trends as well as any underlying political dynamics. First, we find a gradual
decline in the frequency of subdelegations over the last four decades. Potential
explanations include a decline in the stock of statutory authority available to delegate
or an increasing preference not to publish delegated authorities. Subdelegations also
tend to occur more frequently during the final three months of an outgoing presidential
administration. Finally, some models show that they are less common during periods
of divided party control between the presidency and House of Representatives.
Consistent with a broader literature, this finding suggests that submerged independent
agencies emerge as the result of strategic political calculations.47
Part III then takes a step back to consider the legal and normative implications.
Submerged independent agencies raise constitutional and statutory issues. Because
civil servants are entrusted with significant governmental authority, they may be
improperly appointed. Because these same civil servants are removable only for cause,
the subdelegations may also interfere with the President’s ability to “take care” that
the laws are faithfully executed. That said, agencies may be able to cure the
constitutional defects through prospective and ex post ratification and review
procedures. 48 More broadly, submerged independent agencies reanimate classic
debates in administrative law that have long surrounded the form. On the one hand,
they likely facilitate the development and incorporation of expertise within the
executive branch. On the other hand, they suffer from familiar concerns about political
46

See, e.g., Moose Jooce et al. v. FDA. https://pacificlegal.org/case/vape-litigation/
See, e.g., DAVID LEWIS, PRESIDENTS AND THE POLITICS OF AGENCY DESIGN (2003).
48
See Part III.A, infra.
47
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accountability. Accordingly, we explore institutional mechanisms to assist political
actors in navigating this tradeoff. For instance, we recommend that political actors
consider establishing a process for reviewing actions taken pursuant to delegated
authority; sunsetting these delegations; and requiring more review of the delegated
authorities themselves, especially around presidential transitions.

I.

EXECUTIVE BRANCH AGENCY DESIGN

It is well-known that Congress and the President design agencies.49 Scores of
studies attempt to understand when and why they do so.50 Less known, however, is the
fact that lower-level executive officials — agency heads and other political appointees
— design agencies as well. Like Congress, they sometimes choose the independent
agency form. This observation raises a number of questions mirroring those from one
level up: which agencies engage in this practice, how often, and why? This Part lays
the foundation needed to address these questions. The first section isolates the relevant
unit of empirical analysis, the “agency,” which we functionally define as the exercise
of discretionary governmental authority. The second section then operationalizes the
concept and describes the method used to generate our dataset.
A. Independent “Agencies”
Debates about independent agencies focus more on what it means to be
“independent” rather than on what it means to be an “agency.” The term “agency,” in
the administrative sense, means different things for different purposes. 51 The
definitional issue often arises when the boundaries of a governmental entity are
ambiguous, for example, when an organization straddles the border between the public
and private sectors or between federal and state governments.52 But these contested
49

See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Does Agency Structure Affect Agency Decisionmaking? Implications of
the CFPB’s Design for Administrative Governance, 36 YALE J. REG. 273 (2019); Brian D. Feinstein,
Designing Executive Agencies for Congressional Influence, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 259 (2017); Patrick
Corrigan & Richard Revesz, The Genesis of Independent Agencies, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 637 (2017);
William Howell & David Lewis, Agencies by Presidential Design, 64 J. POL. 1095 (2002).
50
Cites. Id.
51
See Christopher Berry & Jacob Gersen, Agency Design and Political Control, 126 YALE L.J. 1002,
1019 (2017) (observing that the term “agency” has several meanings in political science and is a
term of art in administrative law”); Anne Joseph O’Connell, Bureaucracy at the Boundary, 162 U. PA.
L. REV. 841, 894 (2014) (observing that “an agency for constitutional purposes does not mirror an
agency for statutory purposes, and an entity can be an agency under one statute but not another”);
JENNIFER SELIN & DAVID LEWIS, SOURCEBOOK OF UNITED STATES EXECUTIVE AGENCIES, ADMIN.
CONF. OF U.S. 14 (2nd ed).
52
O’Connell, supra note 51, at 842 (describing “boundary” organizations).
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borders can also exist within an organization. For instance, is the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) within the SEC a standalone “agency?” What
about the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau within the Federal Communications
Commission? One possible intuition is that lower-level units that exercise some
threshold level of policymaking discretion should be thought of as separate agencies.
For example, commentators often treat the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission as
a separate entity,53 even though it is technically within the Department of Energy.54
The same goes for the FDA, housed within the Department of Health & Human
Services or the Internal Revenue Service within the Department of Treasury.55
Social scientists, for their part, have been surprisingly imprecise when faced
with these questions. What counts as an “agency” often depends on decisions made in
pre-existing datasets, often with limited explanation.56 But some data sources contain
about 100 agencies,57 while others count over 600.58 This disparity is a problem for
those who wish to compare findings and study the administrative state in a systematic
way. Perhaps the most thoughtful attempt to define the concept for empirical purposes
comes from Jennifer Selin and David Lewis. 59 They define an “agency” as any
“federal executive instrumentality directed by one or more political appointees
nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate.”60
As for the question of which units within an agency to include, Selin and Lewis
also incorporate “political[ly] important” bureaus and other subunits if they (1) issue
a rule to Congress reported under the Congressional Review Act; (2) are listed in data
sources as reporting to an under-secretary or equivalent; or (3) are excluded for
national security reasons.61 These criteria lead them to generally exclude Offices of
53

See, e.g., Datla & Revesz, supra note 2, at 784 n. 90 (explaining why they included FERC, an agency
“housed within” another agency).
54
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, https://www.usa.gov/federal-agencies/federal-energyregulatory-commission (describing FERC as “Executive Department Sub-Office/Agency/Bureau” and
listing the Department of Energy as the “parent agency”).
55
See, e.g., SELIN & LEWIS, supra note 51 (explaining why they include the FDA and IRS in their
analysis “given the political importance of many agency bureaus”).
56
See, e.g., Berry & Gersen, supra note 51, at 1019 (drawing from the Federal Assistance Award Data
System and stating that they “focus on the highest possible level of aggregation in the data and,
therefore, analyze spending flows from the Department of Interior rather than from sub-units
like the Bureau of Land Management,” though they “plan to focus on spending patterns by these
smaller units within larger agencies.”); Ahrum Chang, Resource Stability and Federal Agency
Performance, 51 AM. REV. PUB. ADMIN. 393 (2001) (studying 52 agencies based on availability of
Performance Accountability Reports). Datla & Revesz, supra note 2, at 784 (drawing initial agencies
from the U.S. Government Manual without explanation as to why).
57
Department of Justice, Data, http://www.foia.gov/data.html. See SELIN & LEWIS, supra note 55, at 12
(discussing disparities in definitions and resulting counts)
58
Id.
59
SELIN & LEWIS, supra note 51, at 13-14.
60
Gen. Servs. Admin., A-Z Index of U.S. Government Departments and Agencies,
https://www.usa.gov/federal-agencies/a. See Selin & Lewis, supra note 59.
61
SELIN & LEWIS, supra note 51, at 14-15.
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Public Affairs and General Counsel Offices, but to include bureaus like the
Department of Defense’s National Security Agency and the Department of Energy’s
National Nuclear Security Administration.62 In doing so, Selin and Lewis should be
lauded for offering a definition that rigorously synthesizes normative and empirical
concerns.63 Many observers care about the political dynamics of agencies. So Selin
and Lewis sensibly focus on indicia of oversight by political actors, such as
congressional review. Perhaps implicit in their definition is an emphasis on political
salience, for which presidential-nomination and Senate-confirmation serves as a
proxy.
Whereas Selin and Lewis offer a politically-informed definition of agencies,
we present a more functional, legally-grounded one. Instead of focusing on political
resonance, we ask whether an administrative unit exercises discretionary
governmental authority. In other words, we look at whether it is empowered to act
independently of other officials.64 This more functional conception is intended to track
a range of constitutional and statutory concerns about the exercise of delegated power
by administrative actors. To be sure, there are subtle differences between various legal
definitions of the “agency” that matter in fact-specific constitutional or statutory
disputes. Nonetheless, we argue that there is a common conceptual core that is possible
to recognize in service of isolating administrative units within larger ones. The hope
is that this alternative definition will inform future empirical work on administrative
agencies more broadly.
Consider, for example, constitutional disputes about the President’s removal
power: an oft-cited hallmark of agency independence. 65 While the caselaw sometimes
refers to the “agency” at issue,66 the Supreme Court does not meaningfully grapple
62

Id. at 15, nn. 55 & 56.
Cf. Robert M. Fishman, Rethinking Dimensions of Democracy for Empirical Analysis: Authenticity,
Quality, Depth, and Consolidation, 19 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 289 (2016) (observing, in the context of
disagreements over how to define “democracy,: that “[i]t is only through conceptual work
simultaneously oriented toward both normative concerns and empirical research that progress toward
such a consensus can be made.”).
64
To be sure, the concept of “authority” is a nuanced one. We seek to give it content by reference to
examples and other verbal formulations. It can also be useful to think of it in Joseph Raz’s terms, that
is, as the exercise of reason-displacement as grounds for action. See, e.g., Joseph Raz, Authority and
Justification, 14 Philosophy & Public Affairs 3 (1985) (“The fact that an authority requires performance
of an action is a reason for its performance which is not to be added to all other relevant reasons when
assessing what to do, but should exclude and take the place of some of them.”).
65
See, e.g., Breger & Edles, supra note 1, at 1138 & n.131 (“The critical element of independence is
the protection-conferred explicitly by statute or reasonably implied against removal except ‘for
cause.’”); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2376 (2001) (defining
the President's removal power as "the core legal difference" between independent and executive
agencies); Paul R. Verkuil, Separation of Powers, the Rule of Law and the Idea of Independence, 30
WM. & MARY L. REV. 301, 330 (1989) (“The condition that makes the independent agency truly
independent is a statutory restriction on removal for cause.”).
66
See, e.g., Collins v. Yellen, 141 S. Ct. 1761, 1784 (2021) (“The FHFA (like the CFPB) is an agency
led by a single Director, and the Recovery Act (like the Dodd-Frank Act) restricts the President's
removal power.”) (emphasis added).
63

12

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4023822

with the concept as such in removal cases. Rather, what matters is that the “officer”
exercise discretionary executive authority.67 For example, Morrison v. Olson — which
upheld removal restrictions on the Independent Counsel — never characterizes the
Independent Counsel as an “agency.” Instead, what made the office an appropriate unit
of constitutional analysis was the fact that the role was “executive” in the sense that it
entailed “law enforcement functions that typically have been undertaken by officials
within the Executive Branch.”68 Most importantly, the Independent Counsel exercised
discretionary authority in carrying out these executive functions.69
In a later case implicating removal restrictions, Free Enterprise Fund v. Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board, the Court missed an opportunity for further
clarification, while planting seeds for future development. 70 The case considered a
double-for-cause removal scheme: the President could not remove members of the
SEC at will; the SEC, in, turn, could not fire members of PCAOB without cause.71
PCAOB was a “private ‘non-profit’ corporation” modeled on “private self-regulatory
organizations in the securities industry.”72 In severing PCAOB’s removal restrictions,
the Court did not analyze whether the entity was an “agency” for constitutional
purposes or not. Instead, it merely relied on a party stipulation that PCAOB members
are “part of the Government.”73 The citation the Court invoked, however, suggests that
it was clarifying that PCAOB was a governmental, rather than private, entity for
constitutional purposes. It was not addressing the hierarchical question of whether
PCAOB exercised sufficient discretion distinct from the SEC in ways pertinent to the
analysis.74
See Prakash, Removal and Tenure in Office, 92 VA. L. REV. 1779, 1819 (2006) (“Structurally,
regarding the President’s removal power as limited to only executive officers makes good sense.”)
68
Id. at 691.
69
Morrison, 487 U.S. at 696 (acknowledging that “the counsel is to some degree “independent” and
free from executive supervision to a greater extent than other federal prosecutors”).
70
See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 486 (2010).
71
Id.
72
Id. at 484. See also O’Connell, Bureaucracy at the Boundary, supra note __, at 858-59 (classifying
PCAOB as an “agency-related nonprofit corporation”).
73
Free Enter., 561 U.S. at 485-86.
74
In relying on the party’s stipulation, the Court cited Lebron v. Nat. R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S.
374, 397 (1995). That case considered whether Amtrak, a “Government-created” corporation” was a
governmental “agency” for First Amendment purposes. The Lebron Court concluded that it was —
Congress had created Amtrak by statute for the “furtherance of governmental objectives” while
retaining the authority to appoint a majority of its directors. Id. at 974–75 (holding that when “as here,
the Government creates a corporation by special law, for the furtherance of governmental objectives,
and retains for itself permanent authority to appoint a majority of the directors of that corporation, the
corporation is part of the Government for purposes of the First Amendment”).
The Supreme Court revisited the question ten years later, this time in the context of asking
whether Amtrak was also an agency for the purposes of a non-delegation analysis. The Court again
concluded that it was since Amtrak exhibited the “practical reality of federal control and supervision.”
Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. Railroads, 575 U.S. 43, 55 (2015) (“Lebron teaches that, for purposes
of Amtrak's status as a federal actor or instrumentality under the Constitution, the practical reality of
federal control and supervision prevails over Congress' disclaimer of Amtrak's governmental status.”).
67
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For that inquiry, the Court relied on another stipulation that PCAOB’s
members were “executive officers,” specifically, “inferior officers” for Appointments
Clause purposes.75 Inferior officers are those actors that “exercise significant authority
pursuant to the laws of the United States.”76 The Court acknowledged, though did not
hold, that civil servants traditionally do not fall in this category since they do not
exercise significant legal authority, that is, authority that grants meaningful
discretion. 77 Elsewhere, the Court referred to the powers of PCAOB as that of
“determin[ing] the policy and enforcement of the laws of the United States.”78 In this
manner, the relevant unit of analysis for removal purposes is that of an executive
officer that exercises discretionary governmental authority.
Similar emphasis on the exercise of discretionary governmental authority
informs congressional and judicial attempts to define an “agency” for statutory
purposes.79 Take the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which defines an “agency”
as “each authority of the Government of the United States, whether or not it is within
or subject to review by another agency.”80 The definition, by its terms, contemplates
that what are traditionally thought of as sub-agencies, such as the FDA, are “agencies,”
since they are “within” or “subject to review” by another agency. The same goes for
organizational units like offices and bureaus. When confronted with such internal
entities, courts have further clarified that an agency is “any administrative unit with
In doing so, the Court rejected the D.C. Circuit’s efforts to distinguish between individual-rightsprotecting provisions like the First Amendment and constitutional separations-of-power: “The structural
principles secured by the separation of powers protect the individual as well.” Id. at 55.
Both Free Enterprise Fund and American Railroads implicated entities that straddle the
public/private divide. So an inquiry into whether there was sufficient “federal control and supervision”
to constitute a governmental entity seems sensible. But arguably different issues arise when the
boundary is not horizontal – across the public/private divide – but vertical, that is, between different
organizational levels.
75
561 U.S. at 506.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 507 (“Nothing in our opinion, therefore, should be read to cast doubt on the use of what is
colloquially known as the civil service system within independent agencies.”).
78
Id. at 483-84. (“May the President be restricted in his ability to remove a principal officer, who is in
turn restricted in his ability to remove an inferior officer, even though that inferior officer determines
the policy and enforces the laws of the United States?”).
79
To be sure, Congress has used different textual formulations across different statutes. See
Congressional Research Service, supra note 35, at 1 (observing that “the term ‘agency’ can mean
different things in different contexts, depending on what statute is at issue). These different formulations
can result in different applications, particularly when the entity in question overlaps with external
bodies, such as private actors or state governments. Id.
80
5 U.S.C. § 551. The provision excludes Congress and the judiciary, as well courts martial, military
commissions, and military authorities in time of war or in the field. Id. This definition is crossreferenced in a number of other statutes. See, e.g., the Negotiated Rulemaking Act, the Regulatory
Flexibility Act, and the Congressional Review Act. See Congressional Research Service, supra note
Administrative Law Primer: Statutory Definitions of “Agency” and Characteristics of Agency
Independence
(May
22,
2014),
https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20140522_R43562_9723a447364a5019efb1e2115b8231fdd359
9743.pdf.
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substantial independent authority in the exercise of specific functions.”81 In Soucie v.
David, for example, the D.C. Circuit held that the Office of Science & Technology
qualifies as a separate agency — despite being a unit of the Executive Office of the
President — because it exercises “independent function[s] of evaluating federal
programs,” that is, functions granting it discretion apart from the President.82
In this manner, our legally-informed definition of the agency focuses on
discretionary governmental authority. This conception encompasses both traditional
executive functions, as well as quasi-adjudicative and quasi-legislative ones that are
nevertheless executive in nature.83 Focusing on this functional definition allows us to
locate units of analysis that track a range of normative concerns, such as the relative
accountability or expertise of those that exercise collective, coercive power. Most
importantly, it also elucidates how authority delegated from Congress to a political
appointee and then delegated again to a civil servant results in a species of agency in
its own right.
This claim requires us to show how the recipient of a subdelegation exercises
independent discretion, despite her lower position in the administrative hierarchy.
After all, one could argue, couldn’t the initial delegator simply reverse any decision
made pursuant to the subdelegation? In other words, just because someone delegates
to perform a function, it does not always mean they cannot subsequently undo a later
performance of that function. While this premise may be true in some contexts,84 it is
less likely to be so for the class of subdelegations that we study: those that that have
been published in the Federal Register as rules and then, subsequently, in the CFR.
As an initial matter, when an agency official subdelegates their authority as a
published rule in the CFR, that subdelegation may become judicially enforceable due
to the Accardi doctrine, which requires an agency to follow its own rules.85 In the
paradigm cases invoking Accardi, a lower-level agency official acts pursuant to a
subdelegated power. After a higher-level official overrules or otherwise reverses the
decision, an adversely affected litigant brings suit arguing that the delegation should
be enforced and the delegator’s decision nullified. The litigant, in other words, argues
that the higher-level official has violated Accardi by failing to follow the entity’s own
81

See, e.g., Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
Id. at 1084-75. A Senate report during the drafting of the APA also offered that an agency was “any
officer or board” that “has authority to take final and binding action with or without appeal to some
superior administrative authority.” S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1945).
83
United States v. Arthrex, Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1970, 1982 (2021) (“The activities of executive officers may
“take ‘legislative’ and ‘judicial’ forms, but they are exercises of—indeed, under our constitutional
structure they must be exercises of—the ‘executive Power,’ ” for which the President is ultimately
responsible. 210 L. Ed. 2d 268 (2021)”). Specifically, Arthrex note that “[w]hile the duties of
[Administrative Patent Judges] ‘partake of a Judiciary quality as well as Executive,’ APJs are still
exercising executive power and must remain ‘dependent upon the President.’” Id. (citations omitted).
84
For example, when a parent delegates the task of choosing a movie to a child and the child picks an
unsatisfactory one, the parent can overrule the child.
85
See United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954). See generally Thomas W.
Merrill, The Accardi Principle, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 569 (2006).
82
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procedural rule. 86 Under these circumstances, courts will look at the language and
form of the internal delegation to determine whether or not that rule should be
enforced.
Indeed, this was the outcome of Accardi itself, which featured a subdelegation
published in the CFR from the Attorney General to the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA). 87 Joseph Accardi sought a discretionary suspension of deportation. 88 After
initial proceedings before an agency adjudicator, but before his case reached the BIA,
the Attorney General announced that he planned to deport Accardi and circulated a list
with Accardi’s name on it to members of the BIA, who affirmed the denial of the
suspension of deportation.89 The Supreme Court eventually found in Accardi’s favor,
however, citing the Attorney General’s violation of the published subdelegation.90 As
the Supreme Court later characterized this holding, “so long as the Attorney General’s
regulations remained operative, he denied himself the authority to exercise the
discretion delegated to the Board even though the original authority was his and he
could reassert it by amending the regulations.” 91 Other judicial decisions feature
analogous facts: a delegator of authority attempts to overrule the delagatee, only to
have a judge reverse the decision on the principle that an agency must abide by its own
rules, including procedural rules subdelegating authority.92
Regarding the language of the delegation, one critical issue in these cases is
how a judge interprets the rule subdelegating authority: did the delegator intend to
divest themselves of that authority? Indeed, to ensure that an agency abides by its own
rules under Accardi, the court has to interpret those rules.93 Sometimes delegators are
explicit about this intent. For example, one subdelegation from the Secretary of
Commerce to the Director of the Census Bureau regarding population tabulations
made clear that “[t]he determination of the Director of the Census shall not be subject

86

See, e.g., Accardi, 347 U.S. 260; Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363, 386 (1957); Chevron Oil Co. v.
Andrus, 588 F.2d 1383 (5th Cir. 1979); Skokomish Indian Tribe v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 587 F.2d 428
(9th Cir. 1978).
87
347 U.S. at 266 (explaining that the rule stated that “in considering and determining appeals, the
Board of Immigration Appeals shall exercise such discretion and power conferred upon the Attorney
General by law as is appropriate and necessary for the disposition of the case”).
88
Id.
89
Id. at 262.
90
Id.
91
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 696 (1974). The Nixon Court also observed that later cases
“reaffirmed the basic holding of Accardi.” Id. (citing. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 79 (1959) and Vitarelli v.
Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 79 (1959)).
92
See, e.g., Service, 354 U.S. at 386 (overturning a Secretary’s decision to discharge an individual from
the State Department based on previous regulations subdelegating the decision to the Deputy Under
Secretary who had decided that the individual should not be discharged).
93
Nou, supra note 5, at 521 (noting that “even when subdelegation takes the form of a legislative rule,
courts must then engage in regulatory interpretation to determine whether the rule indeed divested the
agency head of her authority”).
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to review, reconsideration, or reversal by the Secretary of Commerce.” 94 In other
words, the delegator expressly stated that she would not disturb the decision of the
delegatee. Another common formulation of this intent to divest authority is when the
subdelegation makes clear that the delegatee’s decision will be “final.” Under these
circumstances, a court will likely invoke Accardi against a Secretary who seeks to later
reverse the Census Director’s decision.
Delegators can also be explicit in the other direction: that is, to make clear that
they do not divest themselves of authority. Most commonly, agency heads explicitly
“reserve” authority to exercise the delegated power themselves. Sometimes they issue
blanket reservations of authority. The Secretary of Transportation, for example,
declares that “except as otherwise provided,” she “may exercise powers and duties
delegated or assigned to officials other than the Secretary.” 95 Alternatively,
subdelegations can also specify reservations for individual grants of power. The
Secretary of Agriculture specifically reserves authority from a delegation to the Under
Secretary for Trade and Foreign Agricultural Affairs on issues “related to foreign
agriculture” and for “[a]pproving export controls.” 96 Under these circumstances,
courts generally decline to apply Accardi since the rule itself retains authority in the
initial delegator.97
Between these two poles are a host of delegations that are ambiguous: they
lack both clear reservations of authority and explicit intent to divest authority
completely. Unfortunately, our dataset does not capture which delegations fall into
each of these categories given the challenges of collecting and coding data on
reservations of authority. Reservations, whether blanket or individual, are often placed
in different parts of the Code of Federal Regulations and have idiosyncratic
appearances in the Federal Register. They must be matched, often manually, with each
delegated power through cross-references. Nevertheless, to try to get some sense of
94

Department of Commerce, Report of Tabulations of Population to States and Localities Pursuant to
13 U.S.C. 141(c) and Availability of Other Population Information, 65 FR 59713-02 (Oct. 6, 2000);
15 C.F.R. § 101.1 (2001). Interestingly, the subdelegation was not without ambivalence. On the one
hand, the Secretary refused to “review, reconsider[], or rever[se]” the decision below. Id. At the same,
he also stated that the rule does not relieve[] the Secretary of Commerce of responsibility for any
decision made by the Director of the Census pursuant to this delegation.” Id. It is unclear what the
Secretary meant when he said that he still had “responsibility” for the decision even if he could not
disturb it. Perhaps he was stating that he was still on the hook for the initial delegation itself.
95
See, e.g., 49 C.F.R. § 1.2, Reservations of Authority to the Secretary of Transportation (“All powers
and duties that are not delegated by the Secretary in this part, or otherwise vested in officials other
than the Secretary, are reserved to the Secretary. Except as otherwise provided, the Secretary may
exercise powers and duties delegated or assigned to officials other than the Secretary.”); 7 C.F.R. §
780.3, Reservations of Authority (“Nothing contained in this part shall preclude the Secretary, or the
Administrator of FSA, Executive Vice President of CCC, the Chief of NRCS, if applicable, or a
designee, from determining at any time any question arising under the programs within their
respective authority or from reversing or modifying any decision made by a subordinate employee of
FSA or its county and State committees, or CCC.”).
96
7 C.F.R. § 2.26.
97
Chevron Oil Co. v. Andrus, 588 F.2d 1383 (5th Cir. 1979) (allowing delegator to overrule delegate
based on delegation’s language); Skokomish Indian Tribe v. General Services Administration, 587
F.2d 428 (9th Cir. 1978) (same).

17

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4023822

magnitude, we drew a random sample of 200 of the delegations in our dataset and
found only two for which explicit reservations were present in the same Federal
Register entries. Further, none of the 200 delegations in this sample included an
express statement of divestment within the same entry. For these more ambiguous
rules, judges will defer to the agency after deploying the ordinary tools of regulatory
interpretation.98
When an internal delegation is interpreted to grant a subordinate unreserved
discretion, Accardi can thus give a subdelegation its teeth. This is especially true when
the delegation’s form also suggests a binding intent. Indeed, one rationale for the
doctrine is that when an agency issues a rule with the force of law — a “legislative
rule” — such a rule is also binding on the agency. 99 Thus, if the rule is deemed
legislative, 100 then a court can enforce the delegation: if the delegatee and the
delegator disagree on an outcome, the delegatee’s decision can stand.
Even if a court classifies a rule as “non-legislative,” however, it may still
enforce the rule against the agency. In Morton v. Ruiz, for example, the Court
invalidated a Bureau of Indian Affairs regulation for failure to abide by a provision in
an internal manual stating that such regulations should be published in the CFR.101
The most coherent rationale under these circumstances is that of due process.102 If the
rule was intended to protect individual rights and an individual is harmed or otherwise
relied on the rule, due process concerns may require that the agency decision that
violated the procedure be struck down. 103 This justification would likely be most
persuasive in the adjudicatory context.104
Separately, courts have sometimes also invoked the APA’s demand for
reasoned explanation if the agency does not comply with its own rules. Failure to
explain why the agency did not abide by the rule, in this view, is “arbitrary” and allows
See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (giving “controlling” weight to an agency
interpretation so long as it is not “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation”); Kisor v.
Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2404 (2019) (stating that “a court should not afford Auer deference unless,
after exhausting all the “traditional tools” of construction, the regulation is genuinely ambiguous”).
99
See Merrill, supra note 85, at 597 (observing that “a strong duty of compliance attaches when the
agency promulgates a ‘legislative rule’ . . . . [which] are universally acknowledged as ‘binding’ on the
agency and its personnel”).
100
If the agency issues a subdelegation as a non-legislative procedural rule, which they often do, courts
ask whether the rule “encodes a substantive value judgment or puts a stamp of approval or disapproval
on a given type of behavior.” Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
Alternatively, if the subdelegation is presented as an interpretive rule, then judges examine indicia such
as whether the agency has invoked its general legislative authority, otherwise possesses an adequate
legislative basis, amended a previous rule, or published the rule in the CFR. Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine
Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106 (D.C. Cir. 1993). CFR publication weighs in favor of treating
the rule as binding and thus more judicially enforceable than had the rule not been published. See, e.g.,
Health Ins. Ass’n of Am. v. Shalala, 23 F.3d 412, 423 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
101
See, e.g., Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974) (invalidating a regulation for failure to abide by a
provision in an internal manual stating that such regulations should be published in the CFR).
102
Merrill, supra note 74, at 581 (“Sometimes, if the regulation is designed to protect individual rights
and the individual can show reliance or prejudice, a rule violation may implicate due process.”).
103
Id.
104
See Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908).
98
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a court to vacate and remand the decision that violated the procedural rule. 105 For
example, consider a case concerning an HHS Secretary’s decision to overrule the
FDA’s determination to make Plan B available over-the-counter. 106 The judge
explicitly took notice of the Secretary’s subdelegation to the FDA commissioner
regarding over-the-counter product approvals.107 He observed that the HHS Secretary
had not reserved the right to review or otherwise “intervene” in the FDA’s decisionmaking.108 As a result, the court characterized HHS’ departure from agency practice
as arbitrary and capricious. 109 In this manner, Accardi and ordinary arbitrariness
review helps to furnish discretion on officials exercising subdelegated authority.
Discretion, however, not only arises de jure, but also from de facto
considerations. The most important are information costs, that is, the resources
required to learn about existing subdelegated authorities as well as what decisions are
made pursuant to them. Because it is costly for delegator to learn about how delegatees
are exercising their authority, delegatees often exercise great discretion in practice. In
the words of the previously-mentioned SEC commissioner:
During my tenure, the staff has improved at giving Commissioners a “headsup” about notable actions that the staff plans to take using its delegated
authority. Nevertheless, there are still times when the staff acted based on
delegated authority on important matters (or, at least, important to one or more
Commissioners) without notice to the Commissioners.110
As a result, it is often extremely difficult for agency heads to learn about decisions
made pursuant to delegated authority until after the fact. These information costs are
particularly high for new political appointees with steep learning curves.
Finally, there are also norms or conventions that develop over time, which
further allow the delegatee to exercise discretion independent of the preferences of the
initial delegator. 111 Consider, once again, the FDA Commissioner. The FDA, by
statute, is “established in” the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).112
The HHS Secretary explicitly has the authority to “provid[e] overall direction” and
“prescribe” actions for the FDA Commissioner, who is removable at will. 113
Nevertheless, HHS rarely overturns FDA decisions under FDA’s myriad subdelegated
authorities, which helps explain the outcry over the aforementioned Plan B decision.
105

Id. at 598.
Tummino v. Hamburg, 936 F. Supp. 2d 162 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
107
Id. at 195 (noting that the relevant “delegation of authority is highly relevant to the discussion of
the power of the Secretary and the scope of review”).
108
Id. at 186 (noting that the relevant subdelegation “includes a reservation of the Secretary's right to
approve FDA regulations in some circumstances,” but that there was “no reservation of any right to
intervene in over-the-counter product approvals”).
109
Id. at 187 (“[I]t is hardly clear that the Secretary had the power to issue the order, and if she did
have that authority, her decision was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.”).
110
Aguilar, supra note 28.
111
Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1163, 1207 (2013).
112
21 U.S.C. § 393(a).
113
21 U.S.C. §393(d)(2)(A).
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As a result, an “unbroken practice of deference to the FDA seemed to have developed
at the HHS level, and there were some grounds for thinking that the practice had
hardened into a convention.”114 Similar dynamics are also true for administrative law
judges115 and inspectors general, many of whom have been subdelegated authority.
Under these circumstances, when the initial delegator attempts to overturn the decision
of the delegatee, she will face pushback from both the delegatee and other political
actors as well.
For these reasons, these CFR-published subdelegations to civil servants can be
understood as delineating agencies that are important features of the administrative
state. Their conceptual underpinnings mirror those of more traditional agencies
frequently studied: like the Department of Transportation, for example, NHTSA’s
Office of Rulemaking makes discretionary decisions pursuant to authority originally
granted by Congress but delegated down. These subunits are usually bureaucracies in
their own right. NHTSA’s Office of Rulemaking, for example, requested a budget last
year of $22.59 million. 116 As previously mentioned, the office takes public
responsibility for NHTSA’s rules.117 These submerged independent agencies should
thus be included in future efforts to map and study the executive branch. The legal and
conceptual basis provided here aims to sharpen what appear to be inchoate intuitions
in the literature about which sub-administrative bodies are worthy of examination as
separate units of analysis.

B. Identifying Delegations
In this manner, there is a class of agencies exercising governmental authority
with discretion independent of the delegator. Those headed by civil servants are
particularly important to study in isolation because they are abiding, persistent features
of the administrative state in two senses: (1) the subdelegations themselves are
relatively entrenched; 118 as are (2) the delegatees — the career civil servants —
carrying them out. Civil servants, that is, tend to remain in government through
presidential transitions. 119 This is not, however, a story of the “permanent
114

Vermeule, supra note 111, at 1208
Id. at 1211-13.
116
https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/documents/fy_2021_nhtsa_congressional_justification.
pdf
117
See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
118
See infra Part II.B.2. See also Nina Mendelson, Agency Burrowing: Entrenching Policies and
Personnel Before A New President Arrives, 78 N.Y.U.L. REV. 557, 589 (2003) (charactering
“administrative policy entrenchment” as a “decision [that] is likely to be reversible at least as a
procedural matter, [but] it is probable that the change will be costly”); See Daryl Levinson & Benjamin
Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 125 YALE L.J. 400, 408 (2015) (“At the most general
level, ‘entrenchment’ means that political change has been made more difficult than it otherwise would
(or should) be.”).
119
See Alexander Bolton, John M. de Figueiredo, and David E. Lewis, Elections, Ideology, and
Turnover in the U.S. Federal Government, 31 J. PUB. ADMIN. RESEARCH & THEORY 451, 463-64
115
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bureaucracy” wresting control. Rather, these powers have been granted by political
appointees themselves. In other words, the President’s agents have chosen to abdicate
their authority when creating submerged independent agencies. The questions are why,
to what extent, and where in the federal bureaucracy this behavior occurs.
To shed light on these inquiries, we used Westlaw’s searchable Federal
Register database to locate final rules containing subdelegations of authority.
Specifically, we isolated all entries on which the stem words “delegat-” and “authori” appeared in the same paragraph. We chose this approach based on our qualitative
reading of dozens of subdelegations and the ways in which they are usually drafted.120
To corroborate this approach, we conducted a validity check using the Securities and
Exchange Commission, which places its subdelegations consecutively in the CFR.121
That placement makes locating the full set of SEC delegations in that agency more
straightforward. We identified 206 SEC delegations in the Federal Register. The CFR
sections in which SEC delegations are located also contain these same 206 delegations
(as well as other delegations that occurred outside our study period). These 206
delegations in the CFR are cross-referenced with the Federal Register entries that we
identified. Accordingly, we have strong reason to believe that we have collected
essentially all of the subdelegations printed in the Federal Register during the study
period.
With a team of research assistants, we then coded the search results for a
number of variables. For each subdelegation, we recorded the codified text of the
delegation; the positions delegating and receiving the authority; whether those
positions are occupied by political appointees or civil servants; the dates on which the
subdelegation was announced and went into effect; whether further redelegation is
authorized; and whether the entry revokes a previous subdelegation. To identify civil
servant versus political appointee status, we used the “Plum Book,” a quadrennial
publication that lists over 7,000 executive-branch leadership positions that may be
subject to noncompetitive (or political) appointment.122 We classified an office as a
political appointment if, in the most recent Plum Book published prior to the
delegation, the type of appointment is listed as a presidential appointment with or
without Senate confirmation; non-career, limited term, limited emergency, or
Schedule C appointment; or an appointment excepted by statute. Career appointments
and positions not listed in the relevant Plum Book are classified as civil service
positions.
(2020) (finding varying degrees of stability in the career civil service after federal elections, but
“negligible responsiveness to transitions” for lower-level career staff).
120
Specifically, we used a variety of alternative search terms—e.g., “assign-“ or “transfer” instead of
“delegat-“—and read a sample of the Federal Register entries that these Westlaw searches returned to
identify relevant entries. The only relevant entries that these alternative search terms returned would
also have been obtained via our favored search terms.
121
See 17 C.F.R. § 200.30 (listing SEC delegations).
122
United States Government Policy and Supporting Positions (Plum Book),
https://www.govinfo.gov/collection/plumbook?path=/GPO/United%20States%20Government%20Policy%20and%20Supporting%20Positions
%20%2528Plum%20Book%2529
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The process yielded 1,389 relevant Federal Register entries from June 14, 1979
through August 31, 2019. Because many of these entries contain multiple
subdelegations, we then disaggregated them by each specific authority granted.123 In
all, the dataset initially contained 5,549 discrete subdelegations. We then used a
machine-learning classification approach to isolate delegations of discretionary
governmental authority — our main criterion for distinguishing those that demarcate
agencies from those that do not. 124 A subdelegation furnishes discretion on the
delegatee if it does not require the assent or review of the delegator. Examples of
governmental authority include the power to promulgate regulations, 125 impose
penalties,126 grant or deny waivers of regulatory requirements,127 and settle litigation
to which the agency is a party.128 By contrast, subdelegations that grant discretion to
the delegatee but do not involve the exercise of governmental authority include
ministerial or consultative tasks, such as providing nonbinding assistance,129 issuing

123

Ordinarily, multiple subdelegations within a given Federal Register entry are placed within separate
CFR subsection revisions near the end of the Federal Register entry. On rare occasion, RAs had to make
judgment calls regarding whether, e.g., the statement that “the authority to determine Subjects A and B
is delegated to Office 1” contains one or two delegations. Determining the precise number of delegates
for a given delegation sometimes proves impossible. For instance, in 1981 the Small Business
Administration delegated the authority to enter into loan guarantees to an unspecified number of districtlevel personnel holding certain positions. 46 Fed. Reg. 34309-02 (July 1, 1981).
124
Our use of machine-learning techniques places this Article within a growing cluster of scholarship
studying legal texts with computational methods. See, e.g., Julian Nyarko, Stickiness and Incomplete
Contracts, 88 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (2021); Jonathan Choi, An Empirical Study of Statutory Interpretation
in Tax Law, 95 N.Y.U. L. REV. 363 (2020); Gabriel Rauterberg & Eric Talley, Contracting out of the
Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty: An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Opportunity Waivers, 117 COLUM. L.
REV. 1075 (2017).
125
See, e.g., 60 Fed. Reg. 47267-01 (delegating authority to the director of the FDA Center for Devices
and Radiological Health to “promulgate regulations under which the Director may withdraw approval
of [mammography facility] accreditation bodies”).
126
See, e.g., 58 Fed. Reg. 34212-01 (delegating authority to the FDA’s Deputy Commissioner of
Operations “in all administrative civil money penalties proceedings … to issue the final decision for the
Commissioner, which constitutes final agency action” under several drug, medical device, and vaccine
safety laws).
127
See, e.g., 80 Fed. Reg. 81178-01 (delegating authority to the Director of FERC’s Office of
Enforcement to, inter alia, “deny or grant … requests for waiver of the requirements of [several] forms,
data collections, and reports” concerning natural gas market participants).
128
See, e.g., 83 Fed. Reg. 61309-01 (delegating authority to the NTSB General Counsel the authority
to “compromise, settle, or otherwise represent the Board’s interest in judicial or administrative actions
to which the Board is a party or in which the Board is interested”).
129
See, e.g., 53 Fed. Reg. 18253-01 (delegating from the Secretary of Agriculture and others to the
Chief of the USDA Soil Conservation Service to, inter alia, “[p]rovide technical assistance on soil and
water conservation technology”)
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informational notices,130 communicating with others,131 and authenticating documents
for use in adjudications.132
Applying this criterion, we then hand-coded a set of 1,400 subdelegations for
whether each involves the exercise of discretionary governmental authority. We then
divided this set into a “training” batch with 1,200 subdelegations and a “test” batch
with the remaining 200 items. Next, we ran a series of machine-learning classifiers on
the training data. Although the details differ by classifier, each classifier searches for
patterns of words or syllables that are associated with the classification of a
subdelegation in the training batch as authoritative or not, and then uses the appearance
of these patterns in the test batch to predict the significance of each item in that
batch. 133 We then selected the classifier that achieved the highest F1 score—a
combined measure of precision and recall 134 —on the test batch. 135 This classifier
accurately predicted 95% of all subdelegations and achieved an F1 score of 0.78, which
is comparable with other classifiers applied to legal texts.136 This process led us to
eliminate 2,191 subdelegations from the remaining analyses, leaving us with 3,358
subdelegations of discretionary governmental authority.

130

See, e.g., 66 Fed. Reg. 30992-01 (authorizing several civil-service positions in the FDA Center for
Food Safety and Applied Nutrition “to issue notices of confirmation of effective date of [several
categories of] final regulations”).
131
See, e.g., 49 Fed. Reg. 9565-01 (delegating authority to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Manpower, Installations, and Logistics to “[c]ommunicate with other government agencies,
representatives of the legislative branch, and members of the public”).
132
55 FR 11167-01 (delegating authority to the Director of the SEC Office of Applications and Reports
Services to “authenticate all Commission documents produces for administrative or judicial
proceedings”).
133
To identify the optimal classifier, we ran classifiers with every possible combination of the following
two features: (1) preprocessing method: 3-grams & words, 3-grams, 4-grams, 5-grams, or Englishlanguage Lemmatization; and (2) classifier algorithm: naïve Bayes or k-nearest neighbor. These options
produce 10 possible combinations, each of which we ran. For all ten, we removed punctuation and
unusual characters, replaced upper-case with lower-case letters, and analyzed the first 500 words in
each subdelegation (in practice, the entire text). We then ran each classifier using WordStat software
and selected the one that generated the highest F1 score. See infra note __.
134
Precision measures how many positive predictions that the classifier makes are correct (correctively
predicted positive cases divided by total number of predicted positive cases). Recall measures how
many true positives in the dataset the classifier found (correctly predicted positive cases divided by the
actual number of positive cases in the dataset). F1 is the harmonic mean of precision and recall.
135
This specification has the following attributes. We preprocessed the test batch by breaking the text
of each delegation into 3-word sequences known as trigrams or 3-grams. We then employed a naïve
Bayes classifier with a multinomial distribution. We also tried many other combinations of
prepossessing methods and classifiers, and selected the combination that generated the highest F1 score.
The average precision for our model is 0.80 and the average recall is 0.76.
136
See Choi, supra note __, at 402 (reporting scores of 0.76 and 0.71 in analyses of judicial opinions);
Jennifer Nou & Julian Nyarko, Regulatory Diffusion, 74 STAN. L. REV. __, *14 n.69 (forthcoming)
(0.83 score for analysis of regulatory text).
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II.

FINDINGS

This Part now uses our novel dataset to present a descriptive portrait of
submerged independent agencies. The first section looks at which officials are likely
to be delegators versus delegatees of congressionally-granted authority. The second
examines trends in subdelegations over time and across presidential administrations.
The final section then looks at the timing of the practice and finds that it is more likely
to occur during the midnight period before a presidential transition in power.
A. Delegators and Delegatees
Virtually all of the subdelegations in our database identify the official with
whom power is initially vested — the delegator, in our parlance — and the delegatee
to whom the power is assigned. Most delegatees in this subset are individuals, though
there are also transfers to states, other subnational units, and other federal agencies.
Appendix A presents additional information about these delegators and delegatees.
Most subdelegations devolve power down the organization chart: from higher-level
appointees to lower-level ones, or from appointees to civil servants.137 As Figure 1
shows, almost all of the delegators — 99 percent — are political appointees.138 Civil
servants comprise a majority of the delegatees: 59 percent. This subset of delegations
from appointees to career staff are the focus of this study.

137

In most cases, delegators do not appear to retain authority to also exercise the subdelegated power.
Analysis of a random sample of 200 subdelegations in our dataset reveals only two subdelegations in
which the delegator reserved the right to exercise concurrent authority with the delegatee concerning
the entire power in question. See 49 Fed. Reg. 46527-02 (Nov. 27, 1984) (“No [sub]delegation
prescribed herein shall preclude the [delegatee] … from exercising any of the powers or functions
[described in the subdelegation].”); 46 Fed. Reg. 60414-01 (Dec. 10, 1981) (identical provision).
Notably, both subdelegations concern the USDA’s Packers and Stockyards Administration, which is by
chance overrepresented in our random sample, with two out of fifty entries. For each of the 200
subdelegations in this analysis, we examined whether the Federal Register entry containing the
subdelegation also included an express reservation of authority. Due to data limitations, we did not
examine whether relevant reservations, either pertaining specifically to the subdelegation in question or
to agency subdelegations in general, were included in separate Federal Register entries.
138
The numbers of subdelegations in the figure do not sum to the total number of delegations involving
agency-like authority because some delegations do not list the delegator; list both appointee and civil
servaPartnt delegatees; or list another type of delegatee, e.g., a state or local government.
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Figure 1:
Transfers of Authority to and from Appointees and Civil Servants
Delegator

Delegate

Appointee

1,125

Appointee

Civil Servant

20

Civil Servant

At first glance, that most subdelegations are from appointees to civil servants
seems surprising. Why would political appointees cede authority to civil servants over
whom they have limited control? After all, civil servants have tenure protections. They
cannot be easily fired if recalcitrant. Why not just use them as advisors rather than
final decision-makers? If the motivation is merely to save resources, then why not
delegate to a more loyal appointee instead? These questions become all the more
pressing in light of our finding, discussed further below, that once these delegations
are granted to a civil servant, they are infrequently revoked.139
Perhaps part of the answer is that a substantial number of these civil servants
are members of the Senior Executive Service (SES) and therefore more subject to
political control, at least relative to line career staff.140 The SES was created under the
Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA) to “ensure that the government … is
responsive to the needs, policies and goals of the Nation.”141 The hope was to create a
139

See infra Part II.B.2.
Forty-four percent of the civil-servant delegatees in our dataset are listed in the Plum Books as career
appointees, all of whom are SES members. Another 36 percent of civil-servant delegatees are not listed
in the Plum Book, which means they are either positions in the general service or SES members in
career-reserved SES positions. Presumably, some positions within this latter group are held by SES
members. (Positions listed in the Plum Book as being held by career appointees could alternatively be
held by non-career appointees, at agency leaders’ discretion and subject to several limitations. Careerreserved positions must be held by an SES member of the career civil service. Because agency leaders
cannot slot noncareer appointees into career-reserved positions, these positions do not appear in the
Plum Books.)
141
5 U.S.C § 3131.
140
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more experienced “interface” between political appointees and civil servants with
often-clashing objectives and worldviews.142 Accordingly, the statute allowed agency
heads more mechanisms to control SES members, while still furnishing the SES with
protections against arbitrary firings and reassignments.143
Political supervisors, for example, can reassign career SES members to other
SES positions within the same agency or transfer them to SES positions in other
agencies.144 Career SES members with performance reviews below a certain threshold
can be reassigned to another SES position; members with even lower performance
reviews must be removed from the SES and placed into the regular civil service.145
These tools of control may help explain why a delegator would grant authority to them
over a non-SES civil servant, but it does not fully explain the substantial number that
run to ordinary line staff as well.
Returning to our initial descriptive account, a broad and diverse set of actors
create submerged independent agencies. Appointees occupying 66 distinct offices are
represented as delegators in our dataset. Delegators’ positions include cabinet
secretaries, administrators of important subagencies, various undersecretaries and
assistant secretaries, and independent regulatory commissioners.146 Table 1 lists the
ten delegator positions with the most subdelegations to civil servants.

See Anne Joseph O’Connell, Vacant Offices: Delays in Staffing Top Agency Positions, 82 S. CAL.
L. REV. 913 (2009). The CSRA prohibits political appointees from occupying more than 10 percent of
the total number of SES positions and more than 25 percent of the SES positions within a single agency.
It also classifies some positions as “career reserved,” meaning that only protected civil servants can
occupy them. 5 U.S.C. § 3132-4.
143
Government Accountability Office, Senior Executive Service: Opportunities for Selected Agencies
to Improve their Career Reassignment Processes, Sept. 16, 2020, https://www.gao.gov/products/gao20-559. Career SES members retain some important employment protections. For instance, they cannot
be involuntarily reassigned within the first 120 days following the installation of a new agency head or
politically appointed supervisor. 5 U.S.C. § 3395(e). Further, various procedural requirements provide
career SES members under threat of removal with due-process protections; the process of removing a
career SES member includes several notice requirements and, in most circumstances, the member’s
right to request an informal hearing before an official designated by the Merit Systems Protection Board.
5 CFR 359.502. This informal hearing is distinct from a full hearing before the Board, and the
disposition of the informal hearing is not appealable to the Board. Id. at 359.504. Two exceptions to
this general rule are that career SES members who are removed based on a reduction in force have
greater procedural protections, Id. at 359.601-359.608, and career SES members who are removed
during their probationary period hold fewer procedural protections. Id. at 359.401-359.407.
Importantly, removal from the SES—the most severe action that appointees can undertake against SES
members in ordinary circumstances—merely returns the former SES member back to a regular civilservice position. Id. at 359.701-259.705.
144
5 U.S.C § 3395(a). Transfers must be approved by the receiving agency. Id.
145
5 U.S.C § 4314(b). Agencies have even wider latitude to remove employees from the SES during
the employee’s probationary period. See 5 CFR 359.402 & 359.403.
146
These 66 delegator offices are situated within 28 distinct cabinet-level departments, independent
agencies, and other government entities.
142
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Table 1: Most Common Officials Subdelegating Authority to Civil Servants
Delegator’s Position

% of Total
Subdelegs.

Commissioner, Food & Drug Admin. (HHS)

17%

Secretary of the Department of Agriculture (USDA)

10%

Administrator, Rural Electrification Admin. (USDA)

8%

Commissioners, Federal Maritime Commission

6%

Administrator, Small Business Admin.

6%

Board of Directors, Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.

6%

Commissioners, Securities & Exchange Commission

5%

Commissioners, Federal Communication Commission

4%

Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System

3%

Board Members, Surface Transportation Board147

3%

As the table shows, the FDA Commissioner leads the field concerning subdelegations,
with two officials in the Department of Agriculture—the Secretary and the
Administrator of the USDA’s Rural Electrification Administration (REA)—
occupying the second and third positions, respectively. Beyond these three, officials
with jurisdiction over an eclectic set of programs and policies are represented, with a
tilt toward independent regulatory commissioners over officials in executive
departments. Eight of the top ten delegators are the top-level official (or multi-member
board of officials) in the agency.
Greater examination of two of the most-frequent delegators — the FDA
Commissioner and Rural Electrification Administrator — may shed light on why
appointees willfully cede power. The FDA’s status as the agency with the most
published subdelegations can likely be explained by the heightened scrutiny it faces
over whether decisions there are made for political or science-based reasons. More
than most agencies, its power to engage in pre-market interventions stems from its
reputation.148 As Daniel Carpenter has persuasively argued, this public face is that of
147

Figure includes delegations from the commissioners of the now-defunct Interstate Commerce
Commission, which was abolished in 1995 with many of its functions transferred to the nascent Surface
Transportation
Board.
See
U.S.
Government
Manual,
2020
ed.,
88,
https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/GOVMAN-2020-11-10.
148
See generally DANIEL CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER: ORGANIZATIONAL IMAGE AND
PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION AT THE FDA 11 (2010) (“The regulatory power of the [FDA] stems in
large measure from a reputation that inspires both praise and fear.”). Carpenter defines an
“organizational reputation” as “a set of symbolic beliefs about the unique or separable capacities, roles,
and obligations of an organization, where these beliefs are embedded in audience network.” Id.at 45.
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a “protector of patient and consumer safety” as well as that of “scientific accuracy.”149
Subdelegation to more expert civil servants can bolster this reputation: it can operate
as a tool for increasing legitimacy and public confidence in the agency’s decisions.
Witness this dynamic at work in a recent controversy one level up, between
HHS and the FDA. As discussed earlier, 150 the HHS Secretary has the statutory
authority to “prescribe” actions for the FDA commissioner who lacks tenure
protections. Nevertheless, in 2020, HHS Secretary, Alex Azar faced an outcry when
he issued an internal memo prohibiting the FDA from signing any new rules and
reserving that power to himself. 151 While Azar’s chief-of-staff said the memo was
merely a “housekeeping matter” aimed at “good governance,” many feared that the
memo “could contribute to a public perception of political meddling in science-based
regulatory decisions” — at a time when a global pandemic was still raging.152
To revive the FDA’s reputation, the Biden Administration’s HHS Secretary,
Xavier Becerra, published a notice in the Federal Register explicitly “revok[ing]”
Azar’s previous memo, “reinstat[ing] any delegations to FDA rescinded” and making
clear his intent to “delegate” to the FDA Commissioner “the authority vested in the
Secretary to issue all regulations of the FDA,” with some limited reservations of that
authority.153 The move seemed to have worked, as reflected by former Trump FDA
Commissioner Scott Gottlieb’s comment that the subdelegation “restore[d] an
essential element of FDA’s independent judgement and [will] allow the agency to act
faster.”154 In this manner, a published subdelegation had the effect of restoring the
agency’s expert-driven bipartisan bona fides.
Among other lower-level officials included in the table above, the REA
Administrator within the USDA also merits greater discussion. The Administrator is
the head of a relatively obscure, now-defunct USDA subagency dealing with rural
electrification that is nonetheless responsible for eight percent of subdelegations in our
dataset. All of the subdelegations from this official are, unusually, contained in one
Federal Register entry – an outlier in our dataset.155 Although a definitive account of
why the Administrator subdelegated 121 discrete powers on a single day in April 1994
remains elusive, the historical context may provide some clues. The REA had been
149

Id.
See supra notes 112-115 and accompanying text.
151
See Sheila Kaplan, In ‘Power Grab,’ Health Secretary Azar Asserts Authority Over F.D.A., N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 19, 2020), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/19/health/azar-hhsfda.html?action=click&module=RelatedLinks&pgtype=Article.
152
Id.
153
86 Fed. Reg. 49337, 49337 (Sept. 2, 2021).
154
Bloomberg News, FDA Regains Rulemaking Authority in Reversal of Trump-Era Move (Sept. 21,
2021), available at https://news.bloomberglaw.com/health-law-and-business/fda-regains-rulemakingauthority-in-reversal-of-trump-era-move
155
59 Fed. Reg. 21623-01 (Apr. 26, 1994). As a robustness check, we re-ran all of the analyses in this
Part excluding the REA subdelegations contained in this Federal Register entry. The only material
change is that the coefficient estimate concerning midnight subdelegations (Table 2, Model 1) is larger
and significant at the more demanding p < 0.01 level.
150
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subject to bipartisan calls to reduce its budget throughout the early 1990s. 156 In
December 1993, an internal whistleblower’s accusations of waste, potential fraud, and
mismanagement at the REA generated headlines 157 — perhaps bringing it more
directly into policymakers’ sights. In October 1994 — six months after the
subdelegations were published — President Clinton signed into law a bill that, inter
alia, transferred REA’s programs to a new entity within USDA and limited the
potential set of positions to whom the holder of a newly established undersecretary
position with authority over these programs could subdelegate this authority. 158
This context suggests two possible explanations for why the REA
administrator subdelegated this large number of powers in one fell swoop. First,
familiarly, he may have intended this action to be a good-government measure, placing
authority in the hands of civil servants that were viewed as neutral experts in an effort
to reform a scandal-plagued organization. Second, he may have also anticipated
legislative changes to the REA (if not its demise), and thus strategically assigned
functions to aligned civil servants that he expected would be costly for successors to
reverse. These explanations—which we present merely as conjectures to inform more
general hypotheses—suggest possible reasons why political actors willingly abnegate
their own authority.
B. Trends
Turning from the actors involved, we now look at dynamics over time and
across presidential administrations. The hope is to motivate further thinking as to how,
when, and why the executive branch devolves power. The first section looks at initial
delegations of authority, while the second looks more closely at revocations.

156

See, e.g., Bill Clinton, State of the Union Address, Feb. 17, 1993,
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/WCPD-1993-02-22/pdf/WCPD-1993-02-22-Pg215-2.pdf
(singling out the agency as President Clinton’s only concrete example of proposed cuts in federal
spending); Marcy Gordon, Rural Electric Cooperatives on the Defensive, WASH. POST, Dec. 25, 1990,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1990/12/25/rural-electric-cooperatives-on-thedefensive/705e357e-1f83-42ac-adb4-a10783092d00/ (noting that Republican administrations since
Nixon had “tried to gut the REA”).
157
Kevin Merida, Whistle-blower Zaps REA Management, WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 1993,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1993/12/22/whistle-blower-zaps-reamanagement/01802c2b-df12-4a84-a95a-25fb80d3e141/.
158
Federal Crop Insurance Program and Department of Agriculture Reorganization Act of 1994, Pub.
L. 103-354, 108 Stat. 3219 § 232, 7 U.S.C. § 6942 (former provision); id. at 108 Stat. 3218 § 231(e), 7
U.S.C. § 6941(e) (latter provision). Interestingly, the House Agriculture Committee chair had
introduced the bill in Congress only four days before the date on which the agency’s administrator
subdelegated these 121 powers, see H.R. 4217, https://www.congress.gov/bill/103rd-congress/housebill/4217/actions?r=3, although the as-introduced version of the bill did not include the aforementioned
provisions. See https://www.congress.gov/bill/103rd-congress/house-bill/4217/text/ih?r=3.
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1. Initial Delegations
How do initial grants of power to career staff vary over time? Figure 2 displays
the number of new subdelegations to civil servants per month, along with a lowess
curve in blue and associated 95 percent confidence interval in gray. Dashed lines
signify changes in presidential administration. In general, the figure shows a declining
number of new subdelegations to civil servants throughout our 1979-2019 time period,
perhaps with a slight uptick around 2012 (although the large confidence intervals
around the lowess line stymie firm conclusions). By contrast, the number of new
subdelegations to other appointees has remained essentially flat during this study
period.159
Figure 2: Subdelegations to Civil Servants per Month

159

To be sure, the number of subdelegations does not necessarily correspond to their scope or
significance, but we use it as a proxy for estimating the magnitude of subdelegated authority.
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One possible explanation for the downward trend is that there is a relatively
fixed stock of statutes delegating regulatory power.160 As appointees subdelegate their
powers over time, there is increasingly less statutory authority to grant. As a result, the
rate of internal delegations would decrease over time. 161 By a similar logic, the slight
increase in subdelegations in 2012 may be attributable to the passage of two major
new statutes, the Affordable Care Act and Dodd-Frank Act, two years earlier. Another
possible explanation is that officials have shifted to subdelegating their authority in
different forms. Rather than publishing subdelegations in the Federal Register, they
may opt for less transparent means such as staff manuals hosted on internal agency
servers.162 If this is correct, then the trend only speaks to the subset of subdelegations
that are published in the Federal Register. (We offer both possible explanations with a
note of caution, however, given the size of the confidence intervals in the figure.)163
Next, we examine whether presidential administrations differ in their
propensity to delegate to civil servants. 164 Figure 3 shows the number of
subdelegations to civil servants during each full-term presidential administration
during our study period. The figure suggests the possibility that subdelegations activity
declines for each successive consecutive term in which a party holds the presidency,
perhaps because targets for advantageous subdelegations are exhausted over time.
160

See Jody Freeman & David Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 15-16
(arguing that “the current partisan and ideological makeup of Congress renders such action much
less likely, all else equal, than at any time in the modern regulatory era”). Freeman and Spence
also note that “the parties have grown steadily farther apart ideologically since the 1970s, making
bipartisan action to address important problems significantly more difficult.” Id. at 14.
161
As a necessarily preliminary look at this relationship between statutory authority and subdelegation,
we regress the number of subdelegations as a function of a time measure (a proxy for the month) as an
independent variable. The analysis is “preliminary” in the sense that a more robust look would use some
measure of statutory authority, which is currently unavailable, but could be constructed in the future. In
the meantime, the time measure assumes an overall declining stock of statutory authority and attempts
to pick up whether this time trend matters. This analysis finds a statistically significant, slightly negative
relationship between subdelegations and time. Simply put, as our study period progresses, agencies tend
to subdelegate less, even controlling for potential exogenous features.
162
See Nou, supra note 5 (discussing delegations manual hosted only on non-public EPA servers
obtained only through Freedom of Information Act request).
163
At the same time, these explanations are admittedly incomplete. They do not explain another one
of our findings, which is that the number of new subdelegations per month to appointees has remained
steady during the same period as the number to civil servants declined. If the supposed increased
scarcity of new powers to subdelegate or the possibility that officials shifted their subdelegations to
different forms completely explains the decrease in new subdelegations to civil servants, the question
remains why subdelegations to appointees are immune from these forces. To shed further light on
these divergent trends in subdelegations to civil servants versus appointees, we will be examining the
choice-of-(sub)delegate question in future work.
164
This analysis assumes that political control switches on inauguration day. Because presidential
control over agencies operates on a continuum, see Datla & Revesz, supra note __, the extent to which
this assumption holds varies by agency. As a validity check, we also produce of version of the figure
that includes only subdelegations within agencies that feature either of the following structures: removal
protection for the agency head(s) or, for multi-member agencies, partisan-balance requirements
concerning board members’ appointments. This figure appears substantially similar to the figure
included below.
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(The exception, as discussed infra, is that subdelegations are more frequent during the
“midnight” period in the closing three months of a presidential administration.165).
Another possibility is that there is a burst of subdelegations at the start of
administrations due to vacant offices and lags in presidential nominations and Senate
confirmations.166

Figure 3: Total Subdelegations to Civil Servants, by Presidential Administration
400
350

Subdelegations

300
250

200
150
100
50
0
Reagan 1

Reagan 2

G.H.W.
Bush

Clinton 1

Clinton 2 G.W. Bush G.W. Bush Obama 1
1
2

Obama 2

Presidents Reagan and Obama stand out among presidential administrations.
The Reagan administration witnessed substantially greater subdelegations activity: a
mean of 62.8 subdelegations per year, versus a mean of 35.1 subdelegations per year
in the other administrations in our study period. By contrast, the Obama administration
cut back drastically on new subdelegations, with a mean of 14.0 subdelegations per
year, versus 48.1 subdelegations per year in the other administrations. (The latter
number is higher now because it is an average across other administrations, including
the higher Reagan years). Both differences in means are statistically significant at

165
166

See infra Part __.
O’Connell, supra note 142.
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conventionally accepted levels.167
These observations are puzzling along at least one dimension: President
Reagan was known as a fierce critic of the bureaucracy — and yet his appointees
empowered civil servants via relatively frequent subdelegations. President Obama
lacked this reputation — and yet his appointees assigned powers to civil servants at a
lower rate than appointees in other administrations. Further, it is decidedly not the case
that a small number of conservative-leaning or otherwise outlier delegators drive these
results. Instead, a wide variety of agencies exhibit greater subdelegation activity
during Republican administrations; many others exhibit near-parity in subdelegations
during Republican versus Democratic administrations.168
Next, we aggregate across presidential administrations to examine whether the
two parties generally differ in their relative propensities to subdelegate. We find that
agencies subdelegate a mean of 44 powers per year during Republican administrations
versus 37.2 powers during Democratic ones.169 It is important to caution, however,
that this estimated greater Republican propensity to subdelegate does not achieve
conventionally accepted levels of statistical significance.170
These results are, once again, likely to surprise some. The practice of
transferring legal authority to civil servants seems at odds with Republicans’ embrace,
at least since the Reagan administration, of the theory of the unitary executive.171 This
167

For the 27.1 subdelegations-per-year difference in means during the Reagan administration versus
other administrations: t = 2.40, p-value = 0.022. For the -34.1 difference in means for the Obama
administration versus other administrations, t = -2.96, p-value = 0.006. For the other administrations in
our sample, none of the corresponding differences in means approaches conventionally accepted levels
of statistical significance.
168
Despite the fact that partisan control of the White House is roughly evenly divided during our study
period, subdelegations are more common under Republican leadership at executive agencies including
HHS, Justice, Transportation, and Veterans Affairs, and financial regulators including the CFTC, FDIC,
FHFA (including its predecessor agency), and SEC.
169
In light of this variation across parties presidential administrations, we also explore the relationship
between subdelegations and divided government, that is, periods in which the President is of a different
party than at least one house of Congress. Agencies have reason to fear sanctions from congressional
overseers, see Feinstein, supra note, at 1206, particularly when the opposition party (to the President)
controls that branch. See generally Daryl Levinson & Richard Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not
Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311 (2006).
Given that agency heads are likely to be especially inclined to avoid congressional oversight
during periods of divided government, we hypothesize that divided government discourages
subdelegations, because the act of reassigning authority bestowed by Congress on appointees may
provoke congressional ire — particularly when the opposition party controls Congress. A battery of
regression models testing this hypothesis yields mixed results. We observe a negative and statistically
significant (at least at p < 0.10, and usually at p < 0.05) in approximately 30 percent of models
concerning House/President divided party control, and in approximately 20 percent of models
concerning Senate/President control. Given these model-dependent results, we cannot reject the null
hypothesis that the presence or absence of divided government has no bearing on subdelegations
activity.
170
Test statistic for Welch’s two-sample t-test = -0.40; p-value = 0.70.
171
See STEVEN CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER
FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 30 (2008).
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theory generally holds that the President is constitutionally vested with all executive
authority and should exercise it accordingly.172 Conveying that authority to tenureprotected career staff, however, is arguably in tension with this view. After all, some
of the strongest unitarians argue that tenure-protected agency heads exercising
statutory authority are unconstitutional.173 Presumably, tenure-protected career staff
exercising the same authority would be similarly worrisome, perhaps even more so.
Moreover, Republican appointees and civil servants are often perceived as antagonists
— as illustrated by President Trump and his allies’ rhetoric about the “deep state.”174
Conservatives also generally seek to reduce the size of government, which is often at
odds with the self-interest of civil servants. For these reasons, it is unexpected that the
partisan differences in the practice are not statistically significant; if anything, one
could have reasonably expected to find evidence that Republicans subdelegate less,
than Democrats whereas the estimates we uncover suggest that they subdelegate more.
Perhaps this finding is due to the limitations of our approach in counting
subdelegations, rather than alternative measures that better capture the scope or
significance of each delegation. Once deployed, these alternative measures could in
theory reveal that Democratic administrations indeed delegate much more
consequential and salient issues down to civil servants, relative to Republican
administrations that focus on more minor issues. However, we were unable to conceive
of a satisfying measure of scope or significance.175 As a second-best approach, we
attempted to better understand the substance of the subdelegations in the hopes of
shedding some light. Specifically, we employ a structural topic model in a systematic
attempt to understand the kinds of powers granted.

172

See Christopher Yoo et. al., The Unitary Executive in the Modern Era, 1945-2004, 90 IOWA L. REV.
601, 604 (2005) (characterizing the “unitary executive” as one “in which all executive authority is
centralized in the president”).
173
See CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 172, at 428 (arguing that “a removal power and a power to control
subordinates” are the central features of the “Reagan era concept of the unitary executive”); id. at 420
(asserting that “historical practices under our Constitution show[] that all forty-three presidents –each
of them an interpreter of the Constitution—have vigorously exercised and defended an unlimited
presidential removal power”).
174
See Rebecca Ingber, Bureaucratic Resistance and the National Security State, 104 IOWA L. REV.
139, 151 n.31 (2018) (collecting citations)
175
One possibility we considered, but rejected as impractical, was somehow trying to map the
significance of a subdelegation to the significance of the underlying statutory authority redelegated.
Some political scientists, for example, use a dataset collected by David Mayhew characterizing
“important legislation” based on newspaper accounts informed by historians and political observers.
See, e.g., DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARON O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS (1999). The data are
discussed
in
DAVID
MAYHEW,
DIVIDED
WE
GOVERN
(1991),
available
at
https://campuspress.yale.edu/davidmayhew/datasets-divided-we-govern/. A few problems with that
approach here, however, are that Mayhew’s list ends in 1990, whereas our dataset extends to 2019. In
addition, statutory authority is recorded in the Federal Register in non-standardized ways rendering a
matching exercise technically infeasible without manually recoding and researching over a thousand
subdelegations. Even then, the exercise would be incomplete because many times, only certain aspects
of a particular statute are subdelegated, which would require a separate measure of significance.
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To shed additional light on these differences across administrations, we use a
structural topic model to examine the substance of these subdelegations. Unsupervised
topic modeling is used to identify natural groups of words within a corpus.
Importantly, the method classifies words into categories automatically, without human
judgments concerning either which words to group in particular categories or the
optimal number of categories.176 Here, the method identifies twenty categories as the
optimal number of topics.177
For some of these categories, glancing at the words that the model bundles
together suggests obvious themes. For instance, the words that appear most frequently
in one topic include counsel, claim, and compromis*. The “lift words”—i.e., words
that appear more in Topic 10 relative to the other topics—for this topic include these
three terms as well as settl*. These words evince a common theme: delegations in this
topic tend to concern litigation authority.
Having classified the text of delegations into twenty topics, we then examine
how delegations concerning these topics vary based on the party in power.178 Four
topics exhibit greater prevalence, with the difference being statistically significant, in
subdelegations during Republican administrations: food and drug regulation (54%
more prevalent in Republican agencies); closely-related categories concerning drug
approval (47%), medical devices (37%) and FDA citizen petitions (56%); and
financial regulation (35%). Among the relatively obscure topic related to rural
electricity projects and lending is 435% more prevalent in Democratic administrations,
whereas a second category concerning lending is 125% more prevalent.
The Republican tilt concerning pharmaceuticals may be a response to decadeslong conservative critiques of the length of FDA review periods. 179 Under this view,
conservatives’ enduring critique that the FDA drug approval process is too slow may
push them to favor greater subdelegations of authority to speed decisions in this area
by eliminating one or more layer of additional sign-offs before a decision can be
reached. Subdelegations, in other words, streamline the decision-making process,
176

See Justin Grimmer, A Bayesian Hierarchical Topic Model for Political Texts: Measuring Expressed
Agendas in Senate Press Releases, 18 POL. ANALYSIS 1, 2 (2010). Given the novelty of our dataset, one
must be especially cautious not to impose one’s own presumptions regarding which types of transfers
of authority should be classified together. See Justin Grimmer & Brandon Stewart, Text as Data: The
Promise and Pitfalls of Automatic Content Analysis Methods for Political Texts, 21 POL. ANALYSIS 267
(2013) (“Unsupervised methods are valuable because they can identify organizations of text that are
theoretically useful, but perhaps understudied or previously unknown.”).
177
We identified 20 as the optimal number of categories because it combines a high held-out likelihood,
high semantic coherence, and low residuals. In making this assessment, we conducted these diagnostic
tests for 7-30 categories, remaining mindful that there is no “perfect” number of categories. See
Grimmer & Stewart, supra note __, at 270-71; see also Roberts, et al., supra note __, at 12 (introducing
the searchK function).
178
Differences calculated using the plot.estimateEffect command in the STM package in R, with
method=”difference”.
179
See CARPENTER, supra note 148, at 3-4, 8. 731-732 (describing a pattern of Wall Street Journal
editorials on that subject since the 1980s as well as numerous hearings and reform rhetoric over the
years).
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eliminating higher-level review and thus reducing the time to a decision for potentially
life-saving medical and pharmaceutical products. During Democratic administrations,
the far greater prevalence of topics concerning rural-electrification and lending almost
certainly is attributable to the outlier observation discussed earlier; the administrator
of the USDA’s Rural Electrification Administration, which provided loans to rural
utilities, subdelegated 121 distinct powers in a single Federal Register entry in 1994.180

2. Revocations
If published delegations decline over time, a natural follow-up question is how
frequently those delegations are rescinded. Overall, our data suggest that
approximately one appointee-to-civil servant subdelegation is revoked for every
thirty-three granted.181 In the aggregate, our dataset includes 1,596 appointee-to-civil
servant subdelegations, while only 48 revocations are of this type. To give a sense of
changes across administrations, Figure 4 displays the number of revocations during
each full-term presidential term in our study period.
Figure 4: Revocations of Authorities from Civil Servants, by Presidential
Administration
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See supra note155-157 & associated text.
As an example, in 1982 the Federal Home Loan Bank Board withdrew a previous delegation to
civil service-protected principal supervisory agents to permit certain federally insured financial
institutions to change their capital requirements. 51 Fed. Reg. 15876-03 (Apr. 29, 1986). The Board
believed that placing this power back in its hands would “ensure a uniform national policy.” Other
revocations are justified based on changes in an agency’s organizational chart. See, e.g., 64 Fed. Reg.
58355-01 (Oct. 29, 1999) (rescinding authority over motor-carrier regulation from the Federal
Highway Administrator and placing it with the director of the new Office of Motor Carrier Safety).
181
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Several features of Figure 4 are notable. First, President Clinton’s second term
stands out for its relatively high number of revocations. The nineteen in that term were
published in six different Federal Register entries, on six different dates in between
1997 and 1999 and concern five different entities: the Departments of Agriculture,
Health & Human Services, Transportation, the Securities & Exchange Commission,
and the Federal Reserve. One possible reason for the second-term increase is the
greater familiarity the Clinton administration may now have had with the scope of
delegated authority. Because the Reagan administration had such relatively high rates
of subdelegations, the later Democratic administration may have felt a need to revoke
more of them.
Setting aside President Clinton’s second term, revocations in general are low
in number with some secular decline. What, then, explains the relative endurance of
delegated authority, that is, the low rate of revocations? Subdelegations are not
entrenched as a matter of law. Executive branch actors that delegate authority in the
Federal Register can revoke the delegations with minimal process. Because they are
usually promulgated as procedural rules exempt from notice-and-comment, 182
agencies do not need to engage in public comment when reversing them. 183 Even in
the few instances when delegators do engage in notice-and-comment,184 an Office of
Legal Counsel memorandum suggests that the same procedure is not necessary to
revoke the subdelegation.185 Alternatively, it is possible that arbitrariness review could
prevent the mass promulgations or revocations of subdelegations without explanation,
but the question has yet to be tested in the courts.186
The relative durability of subdelegations, however, lends credence to
alternative explanations. First, there are practical resource costs that likely prevent
some revocations. By statute, agencies must “publish in the Federal Register”
procedural and substantive “rules,” which can be amended by another “rulemaking,”
that is another “rule” published in the Federal Register.187 As a result, a subdelegation
182

See, e.g., 79 Fed. Reg. 44101-01 (July 30, 2014).
Agencies are specifically exempt from notice and hearing requirements for “rules of agency
organization, procedure, or practice.” 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A). In addition, the APA’s notice-andcomment requirements for rulemaking do not apply to “matter[s] relating to agency management or
personnel.” 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2).
184
See, e.g., 65 Fed. Reg. 38,370 (2000) (proposed rule); 65 Fed. Reg. 59,713-16 (2000) (comments
and responses, final rule).
185
See Off. of Legal Counsel, Applicability of APA Notice and Comment Procedures to Revocation
of Delegation of Authority (Feb. 14, 2011), available at
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/2001/02/31/op-olc-v025-p0099_0.pdf.
186
5 U.S.C. § 706.
187
5 U.S.C. § 552 (“Each agency shall separately state and currently publish in the Federal Register for
the guidance of the public rules of procedure, descriptions of forms available or the places at which
forms may be obtained, and instructions as to the scope and contents of all papers, reports, or
examinations”); 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (defining a “rule” “rule making” means agency process for
formulating, amending, or repealing a rule”). These requirements are judicially enforceable upon a
showing of harm. See Lake Mohave Boat Owners Ass'n v. Nat'l Park Serv., 78 F.3d 1360, 1368 (9th
Cir. 1995) (“[A]n individual may not raise an FOIA claim based on an agency's failure to publish a rule
or regulation, unless he makes an ‘initial showing’ that ‘he was adversely affected by the lack of
publication....’ ” (citing Mada–Luna v. Fitzpatrick, 813 F.2d 1006, 1018 (9th Cir.1987)).
183
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published in the Federal Register requires another published rule to revoke it.
Publication, however, requires agency fees, but beyond that, also demands time and
effort to draft the Federal Register entry. 188 One might think that these costs are
minimal, but some agencies perceive them as onerous enough to revoke all of their
published subdelegations in favor of putting them on their website instead. For
instance, in 2002, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation explicitly made this
choice in “order to provide the maximum amount of flexibility and efficiency.”189 In
other words, this agency perceived the costs of recording subdelegations in the Federal
Register as a costly barrier to desirable revocations and changes.
Political appointees can also “functionally” entrench a delegation by
mobilizing supporters and other interest groups to fend off subsequent attempts at
repeal.190 The Federal Register and CFR are both highly structured, which make it
easier for external monitors, such as interest groups and lobbyists, to track them and
thus know who holds decision-making authority. To illustrate, return to HHS Secretary
Alex Azar’s memo prohibiting the FDA from signing any new rules and reserving that
power to himself.191 Various interest groups publicly objected,192 albeit often on good
governance grounds. Perhaps reacting to such fire alarms, a congressional

188

Government Printing Office, OFR Publishing Services, https://www.gpo.gov/how-to-work-withus/agency/services-for-agencies/ofr-publishing-services (“All agencies that publish material in the
Federal Register are charged at a per column rate (published columns),” for Word documents, at
“$151/column”).
189
67 Fed. Reg. 79246, 79246 (Dec. 27, 2002).
190
See Magill, supra note 39, at 894 (noting that agency heads “could empower an internal agency unit
with predictable views to be in charge of the agency choice,” thus rendering it “more difficult for
political opponents to oppose the effort or to dislodge it once it is in place”); Levinson & Sachs, supra
note 156, at 482 (describing methods of “functional” entrenchment involving the “strengthening
political allies or weakening political opponents,” “changing the composition of the political
community,” and “empowering a different governmental institution and consequently a different set of
political actors and groups”).
191
See Sheila Kaplan, In ‘Power Grab,’ Health Secretary Azar Asserts Authority Over F.D.A., N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 19, 2020), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/19/health/azar-hhsfda.html?action=click&module=RelatedLinks&pgtype=Article. Note that to the extent that Azar’s
memo was an attempt to revoke subdelegations in previously published in the Federal Register, his use
of an unpublished internal memo was likely improper. The APA defines a rule as “the whole or a part
of an agency statement . . . describing the organization” or “procedure.” 5 U.S.C. 551(5). A “rule
making,” in turn, “means agency process for formulating, amending, or repealing a rule.” Id. The preexisting subdelegations were likely procedural rules, which would thus require another rule to repeal.
The pre-existing subdelegations were likely procedural rules, which would thus require another rule to
repeal. Agencies are required to “publish in the Federal Register for the guidance of the public … rules
of procedure.” 5 U.S.C. § 552. Failure to do so could be the basis of a lawsuit as long as a party could
show that they were adversely harmed. See Lake Mohave Boat Owners Ass'n v. Nat'l Park Serv., 78
F.3d 1360, 1368 (9th Cir. 1995).
192
See, e.g., Kelly Lienhard, Pew To HHS: Reverse Azar Memo, Seek Bill On FDA Diagnostic
Oversight (Apr. 28, 2021), https://insidehealthpolicy.com/daily-news/pew-hhs-reverse-azar-memoseek-bill-fda-diagnostic-oversight
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subcommittee released a report decrying the measure. 193 In this manner,
subdelegations can persist due to a kind of interest group endowment effect.
Finally, there are also internal procedural costs to revoking subdelegated
authority through the Federal Register. Such decisions require sign-off and negotiation
between multiple internal actors, usually involving a structured clearance process.194
The dynamics become even more complicated — and thus costly — at multimember
agencies, which usually require majority votes among partisan-balancing
requirements. 195 Recall the previous example involving the FCC’s subdelegation
regarding domestic data roaming.196 That subdelegation passed a bare majority vote
on party lines. When a different partisan configuration of commissioners later objected
to the subdelegation, they did not possess enough votes to revoke the grant of power
to civil servants.197 In this manner, decision cost within an agency can prevent the
revocation of subdelegated authority.

C.

Midnight Subdelegations

The prospect of durable subdelegations amidst political dynamics, in turn,
raises a key opportunity for strategic behavior: creating submerged independent
agencies in the waning days of a presidential administration. We hypothesize that
subdelegations to civil servants are more common immediately prior to presidential
transitions, especially when there is a new incoming party. Presidents recognize the
value of pursuing durable policy and personnel changes immediately prior to leaving
office. For instance, during the final three months of a presidential administration,
agencies tend to promulgate more rules198 — particularly rules with highly traceable
upfront costs 199 — and submit a greater number of economically significant
regulations to OIRA. 200 Political appointees also hire and promote ideologically

See Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus, The Trump Administration’s Pattern of Political
Interference in the National’s Coronavirus Response,
https://www.politico.com/f/?id=00000174-e9b3-db77-abfe-edbb27190002
194
See Jennifer Nou & Edward H. Stiglitz, Regulatory Bundling, 128 YALE L.J. 1174, 1199 (2019)
(discussing process).
195
Id. at 1198 (“Like legislatures drafting statutes, agencies drafting rules require the agreement of
multiple internal actors. This dynamic is especially true in multimember commissions, which
normally require a majority vote to approve a rule.
196
See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text
197
Id.
198
Anne Joseph O’Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical Portrait of the Modern
Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REV. 889, 923 (2008).
199
Stuart Shapiro & John Morrall III, The Triumph of Regulatory Politics: Benefit-Cost Analysis and
Political Salience, 6 REG. & GOVERNANCE 189, 198 (2012).
200
Patrick McLaughlin, The Consequences of Midnight Regulations and Other Surges in Regulatory
Activity, 147 PUB. CHOICE 395, 405 (2011).
193
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aligned personnel into civil-service positions during the interregna between
presidential elections and the inauguration of a new president.201
Subdelegating authority to civil servants is a similar means of potential
presidential entrenchment. By devolving authority to aligned civil servants prior to a
transition, appointees can preemptively strip their successors of power, placing them,
at least temporarily, in the hands of sympathetic civil servants. We test this theory by
regressing the number of appointee-to-civil servant transferences in a given agency
and month on whether that month falls within the last three months preceding a
presidential transition.202 We run separate regressions for executive and independent
entities, which we operationalize according to whether the heads are removable forcause. 203 Our hypothesis is that presidents hold more limited control over officials in
the latter category, and are thus less likely to be able to entrench power there.
We include several control variables to account for other influences on
subdelegation decisions. First, agencies may have different propensities to engage in
the behavior. For instance, those that exercise a large set of powers have greater
opportunities to subdelegate, i.e., they have a larger “denominator” of statutory powers
that could be subdelegated. Other agencies may have long-established cultures or
norms regarding civil servants, leading to greater or less subdelegations. To account
for these and other agency-specific features, all regression models include agencylevel fixed effects. Second, as Figure 3 shows, different presidential administrations
exhibit distinct propensities to subdelegate. Thus, some of our models include
presidency-level fixed effects. Third, in light of the modest downward trend in
subdelegations over time shown in Figure 2, other models also include a running

201

Mendelson, supra note __, at 563-64.
Jack M. Beermann, Midnight Rules: A Reform Agenda, 2 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 285, 287
(2013) (defining “midnight rules as agency rules promulgated in the last ninety days of an
administration”).
203
As discussed in Part I, the definition of an “independent” agency is a contested one. See Selin &
Lewis supra note 51 at 42 (“There is no general, widely accepted definition of an independent agency
across all government officials, practitioners, and scholarly disciplines.”). While we are more
sympathetic to the functional approach, for purposes of empirical analysis, we focus only those entities
headed by agency officials with for-cause removal. One reason is that we seek a minimal, conceptually
conservative, measure of presidential independence. Another is that choosing just one indicia of
independence may facilitate the interpretation of any statistically significant results.
An alternative set of models operationalize “independent agencies” as possessing either forcause removal protection or multi-member partisan-balance requirements. Whereas the former
provision limits the President’s ex post control over agency officials, the latter restricts her ex ante
ability to appoint favored personnel to these positions. Further, expanding this operationalization to
include agencies with partisan-balance requirements allows us to include several entities that are
conventionally considered “independent agencies” but lack formal removal protection. See Datla &
Revesz, supra note __, at 797 (listing the CFTC, EEOC, FCC, FDIC, FEC, NCUA, and SEC, among
other entities, as possessing partisan-balance requirements but not for-cause removal protection). The
results of these alternative model specifications are materially identical to those reported in Models (3)
and (4) in Table 2.
202

40

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4023822

variable denoting the year in which the observation is situated. 204 Table 2 below
reports the results.205
Table 2: Midnight Subdelegations
(1)
1.684 *
(0.806)

(2)
1.236 *
(0.622)

(3)
0.181
(0.736)

(4)
0.246
(0.885)

Agency Fixed
Effects?

Y

Y

Y

Y

Presidency
Fixed Effects?
Time

Y

N

Y

N

Last 3 Months
of Presidency

Observations
Included
Entities

—

-0.059 **
(0.020)
8,136 agency-mos.
Executive Entities

—

-0.134 **
(0.042)
4,972 agency-mos
Independent Entities
(with for-cause
removal)

Model: negative binomial regression with robust standard errors clustered at
the agency level. Unit of analysis: agency-month. Dispersion parameter α in
Model 1 = 22.76 (SE=4.31); in Model 2: 23.57 (4.27); Model 3: 51.12 (24.55);
Model 4: 56.33 (26.69). McFadden’s pseudo-R2: 0.02 (Model 1), 0.18 (Model
2); 0.14 (Model 3); 0.12 (Model 4). *** signifies p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p <
0.05, † p < 0.10.

204

Because presidency-level fixed effects and our time measure vary collinearly, we omit models
containing both covariates from the regression table below. Nonetheless, we describe the results of
models containing both covariates, infra note 206. In models containing a year variable and
presidency fixed effects, the variance-inflation factor (VIF) for the former is 26.3 and the VIFs for the
latter range from 37.6 for Carter to 138.6 for Reagan. As a general rule of thumb, VIF values above 5
or 10 are taken to indicate substantial multicollinearity. See Jose Dias Curto and Jose Castro Pinto,
The Corrected VIF, 38 J. APP. STAT. 1499, 1500 (2011); Trevor Craney and James Surles, ModelDependent Variance Inflation Factor Cutoff Values, 14 QUALITY ENGIN, 391, 392 (2002).
Accordingly, including both measures in the same model is associated with a sizable reduction in the
precision with which the relative effects of these variables can be measured. See Kevin Arceneaux and
Gregory Huber, What to Do (And Not Do) with Multicollinearity in State Politics Research, 7 ST.
POL. & POL’Y Q. 81, 83 (2007).
205
Because the dependent variable, both here and in all subsequent models, is a count of the number of
subdelegations per agency and unit of time, we estimate an event-count model. Specifically, we use
negative binomial models, which are appropriate where, as here, the dependent variable is overdispersed. The notes presented in the bottom row of tables report the associated dispersion parameter
α. In all models, these values indicate that variance of the distribution of the dependent variable is
sufficiently larger than its mean to warrant a negative binomial model.

41

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4023822

As predicted, Models (1) and (2) report positive and statistically significant
coefficient estimates for the Last 3 Months of Presidency covariate for executive
entities.206 Put plainly, for entities over which the president has direct control, these
results suggest that presidential administrations pursue midnight subdelegations. By
contrast, Models (3) and (4) show null results for those entities over which White
House control is more limited.207 Because the substantive magnitude of estimates in a
negative-binomial model are not intuitive, we also generate simulated first differences
for several agencies. For the Department of Agriculture, which is the agency with the
most subdelegations in our dataset, these simulated first differences for Model 1 reveal
an expected 1.170-unit increase in the number of USDA subdelegations per month
during the midnight period. Similar analysis for HHS, which is the second-most active
agency in the dataset, shows an additional 1.031 HHS subdelegations per month during
the midnight period. For comparison, the mean monthly subdelegations across the
study period for USDA and HHS are, respectively, 0.940 and 0.770 per month.208

E.

Congressional-Executive Dynamics

Given evidence that there are variations within presidential administrations as
well as across parties, we next explore the relationship between subdelegations and
divided government, that is, periods in which the President is of a different party than
at least one house of Congress. Legislators have access to considerable information
from agencies; they receive thousands of statutorily mandated reports from the
executive branch each year and hold hundreds of oversight hearings. 209 When
Congress learns of agency action that it opposes, it can utilize several mechanisms to
sanction the offending agency, from embarrassing the agency head at an oversight
hearing to enacting agency-disfavored statutory or budgetary changes. 210 Agency
206

For interested readers, a third model that includes agency fixed effects, presidency fixed effects,
and the time variable reports a coefficient estimate for Last 3 Months of Presidency that is positive
and statistically significant at the p < 0.10 level (β=1.046, SE=0.631). We do not report this model in
the table due to severe multicollinearity issues when all of these independent variables are included.
See supra note 204.
207
Alternative model specifications—e.g., expanding our conception of entities insulated from the
White House to include not only entities headed by an appointee with for-cause removal protection,
but also to include multi-member commissions with partisan balance requirements— report similar
results. Likewise, a model containing agency fixed effects, presidency fixed effects, and the time
variable also returns null results for this estimate.
208
Simulated first differences generated from Model 1.
209
See William T. Egar, Congressionally Mandated Reports: Overview and Considerations for
Congress, CRS REP. May 14, 2020, at 1 (annual reporting requirements figure); Brian D. Feinstein,
Congress in the Administrative State, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 1189, 1192 n. 13 (2018) (annual hearings
figure).
210
See Feinstein, supra note, at 1206 (describing these sanctions).
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officials face a much less forgiving Congress when the opposition party (to the
President) controls that branch.211
Since agency heads are likely to be especially inclined to avoid congressional
oversight during periods of divided government, 212 we hypothesize that divided
government discourages subdelegations. The act of reassigning authority bestowed by
Congress on appointees may provoke congressional ire — particularly when the
opposition party controls Congress. To test this hypothesis, we examine the
relationship between subdelegations activity and divided control of each chamber of
Congress and the White House. We examine divided party control of the House and
Presidency and of the Senate and Presidency separately for two reasons. First, the
chambers may utilize different mechanisms for monitoring, influencing, or
sanctioning executive-branch actors. Namely, the Senate’s constitutional role in
appointment provides it a lever that is unavailable to the House, whereas the House
tends to engage in more frequent oversight, 213 perhaps as an alternative means of
influencing the executive branch. Second, the Senate’s norms and rules promote, in
different situations and during different eras, some combination of unanimity or
supermajoritarian or bipartisan consensus. 214 These norms and rules cloud any
decision about what party ratio qualifies as partisan “control” of that body. To mitigate
these concerns, we examine each chamber separately.215
Model 1 in Table 3 below regresses the number of subdelegations per year in
executive entities on whether different parties controlled the House and presidency.
(As explained above, we also run companion regression models concerning divided
party control of the Senate and presidency, and report the results of these models in
the text below.) As in the midnight-subdelegations analysis, Model 1 includes agency
and presidency fixed effects, Model 2 includes agency fixed effects and a time
measure.216

211

See generally Daryl Levinson & Richard Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 2311 (2006).
212
For a discussion of how Congress uses oversight hearings to discredit or embarrass the President and
her appointees, and how this activity is particularly common during divided government, see Feinstein,
supra note __, at 1207.
213
See DOUGLAS KRINER & ERIC SCHICKLER, INVESTIGATING THE PRESIDENT 18 (2016)
214 See Barbara Sinclair, The New World of U.S. Senators, in LAWRENCE C. DODD & BRUCE I.
OPPENHEIMER, EDS., CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 6 (2009).

215

We further note that, as a practical matter, there is not much difference between separating out the
House and Senate versus the alternative of considering “divided government” to exist whenever
different parties control the White House and at least one chamber of Congress. During our study
period, Senate/Presidency control is divided but House/President control is unified only from June
2001 through the end of 2002. At all other times, a measure of House/President divided control is
equivalent to a measure of divided control between either chamber and the President.
216
Once again, the table does not include a model with all three controls due to substantial
multicollinearity issues when one includes all of these covariates. Specifically, the variance inflation
factor is 3.3 for House/President Divided Control, 48.7 for Year, and, for the presidency fixed effects,
range from 15.0 for Carter to 91.2 for Reagan. Suffice it to say, a “full” model with all covariates
return null results concerning the divided control covariate.
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Table 3: Subdelegations during Divided vs. Unified Government Control of the
House and Presidency

House / President
Divided Control
Agency Fixed
Effects?
Presidency Fixed
Effects?
Time
Observations
Included Entities

(1)
-1.149 †
(0.658)
Y

(2)
-0.507
(0.385)
Y

(3)
-1.000 *
(0.506)
Y

(4)
-0.706
(0.917)
Y

Y

N

Y

N

—

-0.072 **
(0.024)
702 agency-years
Executive Entities

—

-0.165 ***
(0.035)
585 agency-years
Independent Entities
(with for-cause
removal)

Model: negative binomial regression with robust standard errors clustered at the agency
level. Unit of analysis: agency-year. Dispersion parameter α in Model 1: 3.38
(SE=0.36); Model 2: 3.38 (0.38); Model 3: 6.18 (3.43); Model 4: 6.42 (3.70).
McFadden’s pseudo-R2: 0.24 in Models 1-2; 0.19 in Models 3-4.. *** signifies p <
0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.10.

Models 3 and 4 report similar regression results for independent agencies. The
imperative to avoid antagonizing Congress may be particularly acute for these
independent agencies. Some argue that Congress holds greater sway over these
agencies than executive agencies. 217 The Supreme Court has adopted that view,
asserting: “independent agencies are sheltered not from politics but from the President,
and … their freedom from Presidential oversight (and protection) has simply been
replaced by increased subservience to congressional direction.” 218 Accordingly, if
Congress is able to exert greater relative influence on independent agencies than
executive agencies, we would expect any reduction in subdelegations during divided
government to be even greater for independent agencies. As before, we operationalize
“independence” as the presence of for-cause removal protection for the agency’s
head.219 At the same time, we assume that the party of the independent agency is the
See, e.g., Steven Calabresi & Saikrishna Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104
YALE L.J. 541, 582-83 (1994); Peter Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of
Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573 (1984); Barry Weingast & Mark Moran,
Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade
Commission, 91 J. POL. ECON. 765 (1983).
218
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 556 U.S. 502, 523 (2009).
219
Unreported models use an alternative operationalization: whether its leadership possesses for-cause
removal protection or it is a multi-member body for which the President must reserve some seats for
her ideological opponents. Essentially, this alternative specification captures entities with a substantial
limitation on either the President’s appointment or removal authority. See Brian Feinstein & Daniel
217
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party of the President in power due to the president’s influence over appointments,
particular that of the chair.220
Overall, Table 3 suggests a potential negative relationship between
subdelegations activity and divided party control of the House and Presidency. That
finding holds for both executive (Model 1) and independent entities (Model 3).221 We
present this possible negative relationship between subdelegations and divided control
of the House and Presidency, however, with caution. The coefficient estimate is
statistically significant at the conventionally accepted p < 0.05 level for independent
entities and at the p < 0.10 level for executive ones — but only in models with
presidential fixed effects. Models with only a time variable yield null results.222 In this
manner, our hypothesized link between subdelegations and divided party control of
the House and Presidency is model-dependent. Similar models regressing
subdelegations activity on divided control of the Senate and White House yield null
results as well.
One possible interpretation of these findings is that Congress as a body is not
generally aware of agency delegation decisions — even when they are published in
the Code of Federal Regulations. Given that Congress often relies on “fire-alarm”
oversight, interest groups may not bring them to legislative attention, particularly
when they stand to benefit from them. Alternatively, agency heads may make
subdelegation decisions primarily due to exogenous considerations, such as internal
agency alignment or resource considerations. In other words, the decision to grant
power to a civil servant may be more a function of preference convergence or the
desire to expedite agency decision-making, rather than congressional avoidance.

Hemel, Partisan Balance with Bite, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 9 (2018) (showing that requirements that
presidents appoint their genuine ideological opponents to seats that a nominee of the President’s own
party is barred from filling). Unreported models use an alternative operationalization: whether its
leadership possesses for-cause removal protection or it is a multi-member body for which the
President must reserve some seats for her ideological opponents. Essentially, this alternative
specification captures entities with a substantial limitation on either the President’s appointment or
removal authority. These unreported models yield materially identical results to those reported.
220
See ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND 57 (2010) (noting various
mechanisms to explain why “empirical work suggests that the heads of independent agencies and
executive agencies tend to have common preferences and beliefs, both aligned with those of the
resigning president”).
221

To provide a sense of the magnitude of these relationships, simulated first differences reveal that
divided government is associated with an expected 3.6 fewer subdelegations per year at the USDA, 2.9
fewer at HHS, and 1.0 fewer at both the FDIC and Federal Maritime Commission (FMC). These entities
correspond to the two cabinet-level entities and two other entities with the greatest proportion of
subdelegations in our dataset. See Table 1, supra. By comparison, mean subdelegations per year overall
are 11.1 at the USDA, 8.3 at HHS, 2.2 at FMC, and 1.4 at FDIC. Note that FMC commissioners possess
for-cause removal protection but FDIC commissioners do not. Both commissions have partisan-balance
requirements. See Datla & Revesz, supra note __, at 798.
222

Further, additional models containing agency fixed effects, presidency fixed effects, and a time
variable—which we do not report due to substantial multicollinearity concerns, as previously
discussed—also yield null results.
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III.

IMPLICATIONS

The findings in the previous Part — namely, the predominance of appointeeto-civil servant subdelegations and the political and strategic dynamics surrounding
the practice — raise important legal and normative implications. The first section of
this Part considers constitutional and statutory questions that submerged independent
agencies raise. The upshot of this section is that some, but not all, submerged
independent agencies are likely unconstitutional — especially under prevailing
doctrinal trends. Agencies may be able to cure the potential constitutional defects,
however, through the ratification of decisions exercised through delegated authority.
The second section assesses the broader normative desirability of the
phenomenon. Specifically, it explores how the practice can foster investment in
expertise, but at the same time undermine political accountability. Subdelegation also
has related implications for presidential and congressional control over the
administrative state. Finally, the third section considers institutional mechanisms to
help the executive branch navigate between these two poles in a transparent manner.

A. Legality
The specter of tenure-protected officials exercising discretionary governmental
authority raises constitutional worries about their appointment and removal, as well as
statutory concerns with the practice of agency officials redelegating authority that
Congress assigned to another. This section addresses these matters in turn.
1. Appointments. — The Constitution provides that the President “shall
nominate” and the Senate confirm all “Officers of the United States,” though Congress
can “by law vest[]” the appointment of “inferior officers” in the President, “court[] of
law,” or a department head.223 By referring to governmental “Officers,” the clause
implicitly recognizes that there are non-Officers, or employees. Employees can be
hired through a wide variety of means involving non-constitutional actors. Recent
Supreme Court decisions have provided some guidance on the dividing line between
employees and officers, though the precise contours are highly fact-specific.
In Lucia v. Securities & Exchange Commission,224 the Court considered the
status of SEC administrative law judges, concluding that they are Officers. The
majority’s analysis centered on two dimensions: first, Officers occupy “continuing and
permanent” positions rather than “occasional or temporary” ones. 225 More
specifically, “an individual must occupy a ‘continuing’ position established by law to
223

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
138 S. Ct. 2044, 2051 (2018).
225
Id. (quoting Germaine, 99 U.S. at 511)
224

46

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4023822

qualify as an officer.” 226 This test suggests that Congress must have created the
specific role occupied by the delegatee or else allowed the agency head to create the
position.227 The latter criterion requires statute-specific interpretation for particular
submerged independent agencies. 228 It is worth noting that many positions in our
database were created by agency heads under statutory authority permitting them to
do so.229
One open issue is how courts should approach positions created through
executive action, such as internal procedural rules, rather than explicitly by statute.230
The question is whether such executive actions reflect decisions by Congress to allow
executive officials to create those positions since the Appointments Clause requires
that offices must be “established by law.” It is first worth noting that many organic
statutes contain “general authorizations that might suffice to justify the heads of
agencies or departments to delegate their functions and to appoint persons to carry out
those functions.” 231 For instance, Congress explicitly grants the Secretaries of
Agriculture, Education and Transportation the authority to appoint officers to carry
out their department’s duties.232 William Funk also raises the intriguing possibility that
the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 itself could furnish the requisite authority —
especially for SES members that occupy many of the delegated roles — though he
concludes that it likely does not.233 How courts resolve these issues will likely turn in
part on “pragmatic” considerations234 or a desire to engage in constitutional avoidance.
Insofar as courts generally allow agencies to organize their own internal affairs, they
may also be willing to grant them Chevron deference on the matter — an issue we
discuss in more detail below.
Second, constitutional Officers exercise “significant authority pursuant to the
laws of the United States.”235 According to the Lucia Court, the “inquiry … focuse[s]

226

.Id.
See O’Connell, supra note 26, at 683 (citing Pennsylvania v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 80
F.3d 796, 804-05 (3d Cir. 1996)) (Article II “does not require that a law specifically provide for the
appointment of a particular inferior officer.”).
228
Id. (“Outside the acting leadership context, courts have generally relied on agency organic statutes
to find the requisite authority for the executive branch's creation of positions”) (collecting cases).
229
See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 106(l)(1) (authorizing NHTSA’s administrator to “appoint … such officers
and employees … as may be necessary”).
230
See, e.g., Changes to Regulations to Reflect the Role of the New Environmental Appeals Board in
Agency Adjudications, 57 Fed. Reg. 5320-22 (Feb. 13, 1992). This example comes from William
Funk’s legal analysis of the Environmental Appeals Board within the EPA. See William Funk, Is the
Environmental Appeals Board Unconstitutional or Unlawful? 49 ENVT’L LAW 737 (2019).
231
Id. at 743.
232
Id. (citing statutes).
233
Id. at 743-746.
234
Id. at 750.
235
Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2051 (quoting United States v. Germaine for the first criterion and Buckley v.
Valeo for the second).
227
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on the extent of power an individual wields in carrying out his assigned functions.”236
The majority declined to clarify further, but it is worth noting that the government’s
briefs in the case proposed criterion such as the extent to which the individual
exercising authority has “the power to bind the government or third parties on
significant matters” or to undertake other “important and distinctively sovereign
functions.” 237 This standard closely mirrors the one we used to isolate agency
authority, thus suggesting that most, if not all, the subdelegations in our dataset are
constitutionally significant. Previous cases have also clarified that Officers engage in
rulemaking, final adjudication, and traditional enforcement functions 238 — all of
which are sometimes conducted under subdelegated authority, as our dataset reveals.
Some examples of likely significant authority include the subdelegation of
rulemaking powers to civil servants. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission, for
instance, delegated the authority to promulgate rules concerning, inter alia, nuclear
reactor safety to the Commission’s Executive Director for Operations, with certain
exceptions.239 The FDA Commissioner has assigned to the Director of the Center for
Devices and Radiological Health the authority to issue rules governing decisions to
withdraw approval of mammography facility accreditation organizations.240 A 1999
delegation tasks a career appointee in the Department of Transportation with
“promulgat[ing] … necessary regulations” concerning inspections of commercial
interstate trucks’ noise levels.241 Finally, 2002 subdelegation assigns to the Chief of
the Federal Communications Commission’s Media Bureau a wide variety of

Id. Because ALJs basically utilized “nearly all the tools of federal trial judges,” their authority was
significant, thus rendering them Officers. ALJs “take testimony,” “[r]eceiv[e] evidence and [e]xamine
witnesses at hearings,” “take pre-hearing depositions,” “conduct trials,” “administer oaths, rule on
motions,” “generally regulat[e] the course of a hearing,” “rule on the admissibility of evidence,” and
“have the power to . . . punish all [c]ontemptuous conduct.” Id.
237
Id. at 2051-52.
238
Officers, for example, issue regulations and orders, see Collins, 141 S. Ct. at 1785-86; Seila Law
LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2200 (2020); final decisions awarding relief in
administrative adjudications, Seila, 140 S. Ct. at 2200.; as well as exercise criminal and civil lawenforcement functions with respect to private individuals and entities, See Springer v. Gov’t of
Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 202 (1928) (“Legislative power, as distinguished from executive
power, is the authority to make laws, but not to enforce them or appoint the agents charged with the
duty of such enforcement. The latter are executive functions.”).
239
47 Fed. Reg. 11816-02 (Mar. 19, 1982). The Commission reserves to itself the power to promulgate
rules “involving significant questions of policy” and rules concerning several discrete subjects, most
notably rules of practice for domestic licensing proceedings and rules concerning international trade in
nuclear materials. The Executive Director also must exercise these subdelegated powers “[s]ubject to
general policy guidance from the Commission.” Id. The authorities cited in the subdelegation include
5844(b)(2) (establishing an office focused on, inter alia, “safety and safeguards” of nuclear facilities
and materials); see also PLUM BOOK 130 (1980) (omitting the Executive Director for Operations from
the listed “plum” positions).
240
60 Fed. Reg. 47267-01 (Sept. 12, 1995); see also PLUM BOOK 71 (1992) (listing the Director of the
Center for Devices and Radiological Health as a career appointment).
241
64 Fed. Reg. 56270-01 (Oct. 19, 1999),
236
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rulemaking and enforcement functions regarding broadcast media ownership,
programming, and technical standards.242
All of these examples of delegated rulemaking authority would likely be
understood as significant governmental authority. So would many others in our dataset
given the overlap of the constitutional test with our definition of an agency. Moreover,
most of the submerged independent agencies we have identified presumably were
created under statutes that permit subdelegation. For these reasons, the civil servants
heading these submerged independent agencies are likely constitutional Officers. The
problem, however, is that none of them are appointed by the President, a court of law,
or department head. To the contrary, civil servants are generally hired through a meritbased process regulated by the Office of Personnel Management.243 For career SES in
particular, an agency in conjunction with the Office of Personnel Management
publishes a job announcement for an SES position, rates and ranks eligible applicants,
and approves of the candidate’s qualifications.244
As a result, some submerged independent agencies likely violate the
Appointments Clause. That many of the civil servants exercising subdelegated
authority may qualify as principal Officers exacerbates the problem. Principal
Officers, according to the Constitution, must be presidentially-nominated and Senateconfirmed. Last Term, the Court in United States v. Arthrex clarified that identifying
principal Officers “calls for … an appraisal of how much power an officer exercises
free from control by a supervisor.”245 Again, this assessment requires a case-specific
inquiry; rather than a mechanistic look at an agency’s organizational chart, 246 courts
must also assess whether the individual’s “work is directed and supervised at some
level” by a principal officer. 247 As previously discussed, however, many
subdelegations are exercised with very little oversight or review. Because civil
servants are tenure-protected, they also cannot be fired unilaterally by the agency head,
usually a principal officer.248 As a consequence, many of the submerged independent
agencies in our dataset are likely headed by principal Officer that are not
presidentially-appointed and Senate-confirmed and thus unconstitutional.

242

67 Fed. Reg. 13216-01 (Mar. 21, 2002) (citing 47 C.F.R. § 0.61).
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE: BACKGROUND AND OPTIONS FOR
REFORM 7 (Sept. 6, 2012), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R41801.pdf
244
Both the agency and the SES Qualifications Review Board (QRB), administered by OPM, must
review and approve the qualifications of the candidate.
245
141 S. Ct. 1970, 1982 (2021) (citing Edmond, 520 U.S. at 659, 663).
246
Arthrex, 141 S. Ct. at 1982 (“The dissent would have the Court focus on the location of an officer in
the agency organization chart, but as we explained in Edmond, it is not enough that other officers may
be identified who formally maintain a higher rank, or possess responsibilities of a greater magnitude”).
247
Edmond, 520 U.S. at 662 (emphasis added). Concerning the administrative patent judges at issue in
Arthrex, the fact that no higher-ranking officer could directly review their decisions weighed heavily in
the holding that their appointment to an inferior office was incompatible with the Appointments Clause.
141 S. Ct. at 1985.
248
See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (identifying removal as a factor to determining whether
an officer is principal or inferior).
243
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Recent case law, however, suggests that ratification by an agency head may
cure the constitutional defect—provided that the agency head also possessed the
authority to exercise the authority at the time of the delegated decision. The doctrine
of ratification provides that an individual’s affirmance of another’s prior act that was
avowedly taken on the former individual’s account serves to bind that individual.249
Thus, post hoc ratification remedies an otherwise constitutionally invalid decision by
an improperly appointed official.250 Even the issuance of a final rule—one of the most
consequential actions that agencies undertake—promulgated by an improperly
appointed civil servant can be cured of that defect via ratification.251
Accordingly, an agency head’s periodic review and approval of subordinates’
decisions made pursuant to subdelegated authority would cure Appointments Clause
problems (without conceding that any such defect exists).252 As mentioned, however,
an important limitation concerns the timing of ratifications: the ratifying official must
possess authority to undertake the act both at the time the act was done and at the time
the ratification was made. 253 Many subdelegations in our dataset, however, do not
seem to reserve authority explicitly to the delegator or otherwise make the exercise of
authority concurrent.254 Under such circumstances, the rule of meaningful variation
could suggest that, absent such express reservations, the delegator intended to divest
themselves of authority. If a court interprets the delegation accordingly, then these
submerged independent agencies would continue to be unconstitutional.
Going forward, agency heads and their general counsels seeking to avoid
Appointments Clause problems would do well to draft their subdelegations to reserve
authority concerning agency actions. Even if the delegator never exercises this
concurrent authority in practice, this language can help mitigate litigation risk should
the use of a subdelegated power be subject to constitutional challenge. Further, they
should also consider implementing a process whereby agency heads or other properly
appointed officials periodically review and sign off on subordinates’ decisions.255 This
process should also encourage agency leaders to review the corpus of subdelegated
powers in their respective agencies. This periodic review can potentially help uproot
249

Restatement (Second) of Agency § 82 (1958). Although the doctrine is grounded in common law,
courts deciding public-law cases also apply ratification concerning governmental principal-agent
relationships. See, e.g., Fed. Election Comm’n v. NRA Pol. Victory Fund, 513 U.S. 88, 98 (1994)
(ratification doctrine is apposite, but the particular ratification at issue in this case was untimely);
Wilkes-Barre Hosp. Co., LLC v. NLRB, 857 F.3d 364, 371 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (ratification cures a quorum
violation).
250
See Moose Jooce v. Food & Drug Admin., 981 F.3d 26, 28 (D.C. Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct.
2854 (2021) (“Even assuming … issuance of the … [r]ule violated the Appointments Clause … [a
principal Officer’s] ratification cured any Appointments Clause defect.”).
251
Id.
252
See id.
253
NRA Pol. Victory Fund, 513 U.S. at 98.
254
See supra Part I.A.
255
See Arthrex, 141 S. Ct. at 1987 (concluding that, as a remedy to an Appointments Clause violation,
“review by the Director better reflects the structure of supervision within the [Patent and Trademark
office] and the nature of [administrative patent judge’s] duties”).
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previous appointees’ “burrowed” subdelegations—a prospect we discuss in more
detail later.256
2. Removal. — Turning from appointments to the removal of agency officials,
the Constitution vests “executive [p]ower” in the President and requires the President
to “take [c]are” that the laws are “faithfully executed.”257 The Supreme Court infers
from these provisions that the President has the right to fire certain agency officials at
will. However, the Court allows Congress to place removal restrictions on certain
actors as long as they were not “of such a nature that they impede the President's ability
to perform his constitutional duty.”258 Recall that submerged independent agencies
are headed by civil servants who are only removable for cause. First, their
constitutionality could be called into question if they are characterized as singleheaded agencies helmed by principal officers. Second, even if led by inferior officers,
they may still be unconstitutional if contained within another agency headed by
officials who themselves have removal protections.
On the first issue: In Collins v. Yellen, the Supreme Court considered the
Federal Housing Finance Agency, which was headed by a single Director removable
only for cause.259 It held the removal restriction unconstitutional largely based on a
previous precedent decided just the year before, Seila Law v. Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau/260 In Seila Law, the Court severed a good-cause protection placed
on the single director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.261 It reasoned that
a single-headed agency concentrated power in one individual unchecked by fellow
members of a multimember body. 262 When that single head with “significant
administrative and enforcement authority” was also removable for cause, the scheme
became unconstitutionally tethered from presidential control.263 Collins expanded on
Seila Law’s logic, insisting that the analysis does not “hinge[]” on “the nature and
breadth of an agency's authority,” in particular, whether the agency directly regulated
third party rights. 264

256

See infra Part III.C, which discusses the benefits of periodic affirmative review of subdelegations in
greater detail.
257
U.S. CONST., Art. II.
258
Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691.
259
141 S. Ct. 1761, 1770 (2021).
260
140 S. Ct. 2183, 2191 (2020).
261
Id. 2192 (holding that CFPB’s removal restrictions unconstitutionally “concentrate[e] power in a
unilateral actor insulated from Presidential control”).
262
Id. at 1765 (declaring that “the nature and breadth of an agency’s authority is not dispositive in
determining whether Congress may limit the President's power to remove its head”).
263
Seila, 140 S. Ct. at 2203 (“The CFPB’s single-Director structure contravenes this carefully calibrated
system by vesting significant governmental power in the hands of a single individual accountable to no
one.”).
264
Collins, 141 S. Ct. at 1784.

51

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4023822

Some submerged independent agencies have superficial similarities with the
structure of the CFPB and FHFA. Single delegatees exercise delegated executive
powers and have limitations on their removal. That civil-service protections differ
from the for-cause removal protection at issue in Seila may be of little consequence,
as the “Constitution prohibits even modest restrictions on the President’s power to
remove the head of an agency with a single top officer.”265 For the subset of submerged
independent agencies that are headed by a single, principal officer, their passing
resemblance to the structure that confronted the Seila and Collins Court arguably
render them constitutionally vulnerable.266
Seila Law, however, also emphasized the novelty of the CFPB’s structure as
prime evidence of its unconstitutionality.267 That structure’s novelty was “[p]erhaps
the most telling indication” of its unconstitutionality.268 There is, by contrast, nothing
novel about submerged independent agencies. As we show, they are remarkably
common, with 1,596 new appointee-to-civil servant subdelegations during the 19792019 period. The practice persists during Democratic as well as Republican
administrations and in independent as well as executive agencies. The Federal Register
records the first subdelegation on March 27, 1936, which is the tenth day of the Federal
Register’s existence. 269 The practice of recording subdelegations in the Federal
Register persisted throughout the mid-twentieth century.270 There is therefore good
265

Id. at 1785. Further, civil servants arguably enjoy greater job protection than principal officers with
for-cause removal protection, because a for-cause removal provision “can easily be read to allow the
President to terminate [a principal officer] who disobeys a lawful order about how to exercise the
agency’s (limited) policy discretion”). Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Aaron Nielson, Seila Law
LLC v. CFPB, at 41.
266
The holding in Seila is limited to principal officers, see Seila, 140 S. Ct. at 2192, which likely
encompasses only a subset of civil-servant delegatees. Cf. Collins, 141 S. Ct. at 1802 (Kagan, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (predicting that the majority’s logic in Collins may place the removalprotected, singular Social Security Administrator “next on the chopping block”). Justice Kagan’s
prediction proved accurate. See Lisa Rein, Biden Fires Head of Social Security Administration, a Trump
Holdover Who Drew the Ire of Democrats, WASH. POST (July 11, 2021).
267
See Seila, 140 S. Ct. at 2201 (“The question [before us] … is whether to extend those precedents to
the new situation before us.”); id. (“Perhaps the most telling indication of a severe constitutional
problem … is a lack of historical precedent to support it. An agency with a structure like that of the
CFPB is almost wholly unprecedented.”). See also Peter Conti-Brown & Brian Feinstein, The
Contingent Origins of Financial Legislation, __ WASH. U. L. REV. __ *16 n.66 (forthcoming)
(collecting citations of other recent Supreme Court separation-of-powers cases that deploy this antinovelty doctrine).
268
Id. at 2201.
269
1 Fed. Reg. 75, 77 (Mar. 27, 1936) (subdelegating the authority to, inter alia, accept contracts for
the acquisition of real property, to the Resettlement Administration’s Assistant Administrator of Land
Utilization, and authorizing the further subdelegation of this authority). That day’s edition also
contained several additional subdelegations.
270
See, e.g., 8 Fed. Reg. 291, 296 (Jan. 8, 1943) (subdelegation to the Rubber Director of the War
Production Board regarding the allocation of rubber to military and civilian uses); 13 Fed. Reg. 127,
129 (Jan 9, 1948) (subdelegation to several civil servants in the USDA Sugar Branch regarding setting
quotas for imported sugar); 20 Fed. Reg. 3841, 3853 (June 2, 1955) (subdelegation to the Director of
the Fish & Wildlife Service regarding certain purchasing decisions).
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reason to think that submerged independent agencies are not unconstitutional, at least
under one premise in Seila Law.
As for the second front, even if submerged independent agencies are not
vulnerable as single-headed agencies with for-cause removal restrictions, they may
still be so when they are contained within other agencies headed by officials with forcause removal protection. In Free Enterprise Fund, the Supreme Court held that such
double for-cause removal restrictions violate the Constitution. To be sure, Chief
Justice Roberts, for the majority, was adamant that the case did not decide the question
of SES or civil service constitutionality. 271 Nevertheless, Justice Breyer in dissent
pointed out that the majority’s logic was difficult not to apply to these positions.272
Justice Breyer’s observation is even stronger if civil servants are also deemed to be
constitutional officers, rather than mere employees. 273 As previously discussed, many
subdelegated authorities are significant in character, which makes this conclusion
likely.
If a judge were to find unconstitutional the removal restrictions on a civil
servant exercising subdelegated authority, the question of remedy would be case- and
statute-specific. Courts have sometimes severed the offending removal restrictions, 274
but the inquiry as to whether to do so turns on perceived congressional intent. Given
that the purpose of the civil service laws was to insulate civil servants, it is unlikely
that severance would be the correct remedy in this context. Rather, depending on the
case facts and whether relief is prospective or retrospective, courts may consider
alternative remedies such as ratification or simply deeming the action ultra vires as to
the parties.275
One complication to the above analyses is the fact that the potential removal
issue only arises in this context because of an executive-branch actor’s decision to
subdelegate authority. The President, through control over that actor, could always
revoke the subdelegation if exercised in an undesirable way. This fact pattern arguably
distinguishes it from the Court’s removal cases, which involve congressional grants
of power to tenure-protected actors that cannot be stripped by the President. Thus, one
could argue, the “President’s ability to perform his constitutional duty” is not
undermined by shadow independent agencies.276 Note, however, that this claim is only
See Free Enter., 561 U.S. at 506 (“We do not decide the status of other Government employees, nor
do we decide whether lesser functionaries subordinate to officers of the United States must be subject
to the same sort of control as those who exercise significant authority pursuant to the laws.”)
272
See id. at 538 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
273
Id. at 506 (“The parties here concede that Board members are executive ‘Officers,’ as that term is
used in the Constitution. We do not decide the status of other Government employees, nor do we decide
whether lesser functionaries subordinate to officers of the United States must be subject to the same
sort of control as those who exercise significant authority pursuant to the laws.”).
274
See David Zaring, Toward a Separation-of-Powers Realism, 37 YALE J. REG. 708, 714 (2020); Kent
Barnett, To the Victor Goes the Toil-Remedies for Regulated Parties in Separation-of-Powers
Litigation, 92 N.C. L. REV. 481, 527 (2014).
275
See Collins, 141 S. Ct. at 1795 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
276
Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691.
271
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convincing if one agrees that a potential Article II violation could be cured ex post by
the revocation of subdelegated authority — a possibility that current case law could
be read not to support, though the issue has not been directly addressed.277
Moreover, the President’s removal authority is also arguably compromised
when the subdelegation in question is judicially enforceable under Accardi.278 In these
situations, the President would be constrained from both removing the subordinate as
well as from overturning the decision itself. Any efforts to later revoke the
subdelegation, in turn, could not change the subordinate’s judicially-enforceable
decision. This is also likely to be true in the adjudicatory context, where due process
norms have long constrained the ability of the President to interfere in a pending
decision, even if the President could remove the adjudicator after the decision had been
made.279
3. Statutory constraints. Turning from constitutional to statutory issues,
Congress can control the extent to which authority is redelegated after its initial
delegation to an agency head simply by clearly saying so. When the statute is
ambiguous, however, courts apply Chevron’s familiar two-step framework.280 First,
they ask whether Congress clearly answered the question as to whether a statutory
delegate can redelegate her authority. If the answer is no, then courts defer to an
agency’s reasonable statutory construction.281 This inquiry would require a statute-bystatute analysis of the subdelegations in our dataset.
That said, it is worth noting that courts do not appear to calibrate their analysis
based on the form of the delegation. A Ninth Circuit decision upholding an NLRB
delegation to its General Counsel, for example, was recorded only in internal meeting
minutes. 282 Nevertheless, the court engaged in an interpretation of the statute under
Chevron’s two steps, but did not consider the informal nature of the mechanism
through which authority was granted.283 In doing so, the Ninth Circuit did not apply
the Mead doctrine, which holds that Chevron deference is due when Congress has
delegated authority “to make rules carrying the force of law,” and the agency has

277

Cf. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 504 (2010) (declaring that
“altering the budget or powers of an agency as a whole is a problematic way to control an inferior
officer” while noting that the “Commission cannot wield a free hand to supervise individual members
if it must destroy the Board in order to fix it.”).
278
See supra Part I.A.
279
See Myers v. U.S., 272 U.S. 52 (1926). “[T]here may be duties of a quasi-judicial character imposed
on executive officers and members of executive tribunals whose decisions after hearing affect interests
of individuals, the discharge of which the President can not in a particular case properly influence or
control.”437 T
280
Nou, supra note 5, at 517.
281
See, e.g., Halverson v. Slater, 129 F.3d 180, 181 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that “[p]ursuant to the
first step of the familiar Chevron analysis, . . . [the act] limits delegation” to a third party based on the
text of the statute).
282
Frankl v. HTH Corp., 650 F.3d 1334 (9th Cir. 2011).
283
Id.
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acted pursuant to that authority when interpreting the statute.284 More specifically,
Mead conditions deference on the extent to which Congress provides for a “relatively
formal administrative procedure” that fosters “fairness and deliberation.” such as
notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication.285
More broadly, courts generally presume that Congress allowed the agency to
delegate authority internally, absent a statutory prohibition. 286 That said, courts
currently treat internal and external agency delegations asymmetrically. While
delegations to an internal actor are presumptively valid absent express statutory
proscription, those to actors outside of the agency are not.287 In other words, when
statutes are otherwise silent, judges generally read such silence to permit internal
subdelegation, but to prohibit redelegation to another entity — whether another
agency, private party, or a state.288 The relevant cases usually justify this approach
with one of two rationales. First, accountability with internal delegations purportedly
remains with the federal agency, while external delegations “blur” the lines of
responsibility.289 Second, delegations to external entities also increase the likelihood
that they will be pursued by actors with different interests; as one court put it, they
“aggravate[] the risk of policy drift inherent in any principal-agent relationship.”290
Because the subdelegations at issue in this study are all internal ones to civil
servants, courts would likely extend Chevron deference to the agency’s interpretation
of the statute that the agency claims permits the subdelegation. Even if Mead were to
apply, courts could take note that the subdelegations were published in the CFR as
some indication of formality and deliberation. In light of the constitutional issues
analyzed above, however, courts may be loathe to allow particular delegations of final
authority if they impede on the President’s Article II executive powers.291 In other
284

See U.S. v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001).
Id. at 203.
286
U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. F.C.C., 359 F.3d 554, 566 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (stating that “while federal agency
officials may subdelegate their decision-making authority to subordinates absent evidence of contrary
congressional intent, they may not subdelegate to outside entities—private or sovereign—absent
affirmative evidence of authority to do so”); See also O’Connell, supra note 26, at 687 (2020)
(observing that courts “presumptively” permit “subdelegation to a subordinate federal officer or agency
... absent affirmative evidence of a contrary congressional intent”).
287
See, e.g., U.S. v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 513-14 (1974) (asserting “[a]s a general proposition"
Congress "vesting a duty in [an agency or officer] . . . evinces no intention whatsoever to preclude
delegation to other officers in the [agency]”); Assiniboine & Sioux Tribes of the Fort Peck Indian
Reservation v. Board of Oil & Gas Conservation of the State of Montana, 792 F.2d 782, 796 (9th Cir.
1986); Shook v. D.C. Fin. Responsibility & Mgmt. Assistance Auth., 132 F.3d 775, 783-84 (D.C. Cir.
1998); U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554, 565 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Louisiana Forestry Assoc. v.
Sec. of U.S. Dept. of Labor, 745 F.3d 653, 671 (5th Cir. 2014).
288
See F. Andrew Hessick & Carissa Byrne Hessick, The Non-Redelegation Doctrine, 55 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 163; Marisam, supra note 39, at 891 (terming the prohibition against external delegations “the
anti-redelegation doctrine”).
289
See U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. F.C.C., 359 F.3d 554, 565–66 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
290
Id.
291
U.S. v. Arthrex, 141 S. Ct. 1970, 1982 (2021). See notes 245-255 and accompanying text.
285
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words, judge are more likely to exercise constitutional avoidance to prohibit
delegations that would raise such concerns.

B. Tradeoffs
Apart from their legality, the normative desirability of submerged independent
agencies depends on where one sits. From the President’s perspective, the prospect of
subdelegated authority may be a blessing or a curse depending on which administrative
actor is initiating it: the President herself or the agency head. President-directed
subdelegations can strategically entrench preferences to aligned civil servants,
especially before a presidential transition. Alternatively, presidents can utilize
subdelegations to ensure that an agency continues to function in the face of vacancies
in appointed leadership positions292 Relatedly, delegations can also serve as a means
of bypassing Senate confirmation in favor of a civil servant with aligned
preferences.293
By contrast, subdelegations initiated sua sponte by the agency head can be
deployed as a means of “resistance” against the White House. Sometimes, presidents
and agency heads’ hold divergent preferences, due, for instance, to bureaucratic
capture, civil-servant influence, or pressure from Congress. 294 Under these
circumstances, an agency head can subdelegate authority to an aligned civil servant as
a mean of achieving a policy goal at odds with the prevailing President, while
disclaiming responsibility for the decisions. If she reserves authority to herself, the
delegation provides option value. The same is true when the agency is faced with
congressional pushback or broader accusations of politicizing a matter. In these
circumstances, subdelegating to a civil servant may signal agency neutrality and
expertise.295
The normative valence of each of these strategies depends on exogenous views
about the broader merits of presidential control.296 If one believes that the presidential
control model has been a valuable, even necessary, development for legitimizing the
administrative state, then subdelegation as a means of bureaucratic autonomy is
worrisome. All the more so when bureaucratic power is submerged at the civil servant
level. On the other hand, if one believes that presidential interference is unwise, even
O’Connell, supra note 26, at 658 (“Delegation often fully substitutes for acting leaders.”).
See Christina Kinane, Control without Confirmation: The Politics of Vacancies in Presidential
Appointments, 115 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 599 (2021).
294
See Brian Feinstein & Abby Wood, Divided Agencies, __ S. C AL. L. REV. __ (2022) (reporting
agency heads’ heterogeneous views); Michael Levine & Jennifer Forrence, Regulatory Capture,
Public Interest, and the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. Econ. & Org. 167, 169 (1990)
(discussing role of industry and public interest groups); E. Donald Elliott, TQM-ing OMB: Or Why
Regulatory Review Under Executive Order 12,291 Works Poorly and What President Clinton Should
Do About It, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167, 176 (1994) (discussing White House-appointee
divergence).
295
See GREGORY HUBER, THE CRAFT OF BUREAUCRATIC NEUTRALITY (2007).
292
293

296

See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 65, at 2376–77.
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illegal under statutes that explicitly delegate authority to the agency head, then
subdelegation can be a welcome tool to combat preference interference and vindicate
congressional preferences.297
Taking a step back to consider the practice’s implications for the administrative
state as a whole, the prospect that political appointees can use subdelegations to
entrench their preferences—and thus raise the costs to future presidents to implement
their democratically ratified agenda, is normatively troubling for those that believe
that administrative legitimacy stems from political accountability.298 Given the heated
contexts in which the practice often occurs, the prospect is especially concerning in an
age of increased political polarization and regulatory oscillation.299
By empowering insulated civil servants, political appointees may sacrifice
democratic responsiveness.300 If they had instead retained the authority, they would be
subject to more potential oversight by a President who faces elections. 301 After all,
policy-motivated civil servants presumably value the exercise of delegated authority
only to the extent that authority enables them to move policy from what it would
otherwise be. If civil servants’ preferences differ from their principals’ views, then
delegations generate policy drift.302 Where appointees and civil servants are generally
in agreement, delegations to civil servants—with job protections and long career
horizons—enable appointees to project their preferences into the future.303 In this way,
subdelegations can facilitate partisan entrenchment.304
When the next president comes into power, however, she possess the
constitutional imperative to “faithfully execute” the laws. 305 When some of that
Kevin Stack, The President’s Statutory Powers to Administer the Laws, 106 COLUM L. REV.
263, 295 (2006)
298
See CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW 153 (1991) (arguing that “lines of responsibility should be
stark and clear, so that the exercise of power can be comprehensible, transparent to the gaze of the
citizen subject to it”).
299
See Cynthia Farina, Congressional Polarization: Terminal Constitutional Dysfunction?, 115
COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1691 (2015) (addressing agency legitimacy problems in an era of political
polarization); Gillian E. Metzger, Agencies, Polarization, and the States, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1739,
1762–65 (2015) (discussing the impact of political polarization on administrative agencies).
300
See generally Francis Rourke, Responsiveness and Neutral Competence in American Bureaucracy,
52 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 539 (1992); but see Matthew C. Stephenson, Optimal Political Control of the
Bureaucracy, 107 MICH. L. REV. 53 (2003) (left-leaning civil servants, in combination with more
extreme liberal or conservative appointees, can pull the executive branch towards the median voter).
301
On the other hand, an election-oriented President may favor subdelegations to civil servants,
particularly on politically contentious issues that could divide the governing coalition.
302
See Kenneth Shepsle, Bureaucratic Drift, Coalitional Drift, and Time Consistency, 8 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 111 (1992).
303
Cf. Matthew McCubbins, Roger Noll & Barry Weingast, Structure and Process, Politics and Policy:
Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431 (1989)
(positing that other agency structures and processes can be marshalled to guard against future drift).
304
To be clear, we do not contend that partisan entrenchment is the sole explanation for subdelegations.
Subdelegations can serve a range of purposes, see Nou, supra note __.
305
U.S. CONST. Art. II, cl. 1.
297

57

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4023822

authority has been delegated to civil servants through the Federal Register, it can be
challenging for new appointees to revoke and exercise that authority as previously
discussed. For example, there is an information problem. The learning curve for
inexperienced government officials is steep. Locating and appreciating the scope of
subdelegated authority takes up further time, so may be deprioritized. Second,
revoking a published delegation requires another publication in the Federal Register
to that effect. Drafting and formatting that revocation takes more resources. Further,
the subdelegation could also be “functionally” entrenched: it empowers lower-level
officials who can mobilize supporters and other interest groups to fend off subsequent
attempts at repeal.306
On the other side of the ledger, there are many reasons why submerged
independent agencies should be potentially celebrated and preserved. Most
importantly, credible, entrenched delegations can encourage civil servants to develop
expertise. 307 Social scientists have long recognized that an important function of
delegation is to motivate effort and information acquisition. 308 Essentially, when a
civil servant knows that her decision will be the final one, she is much more willing to
invest time and expertise into making it.309
Moreover, the prospect of exercising delegated authority serves as a form of
compensation to civil servants. Because motivated job applicants will value delegated
authority-as-compensation more than unmotivated ones, delegation offers a screening
mechanism to attract a high-quality workforce. 310 In addition, by tying their own
hands, political appointees can credibly commit to a more stable policy choice; greater
regulatory stability that, in turn, can engender greater investment and economic

See Levinson & Sachs, supra note 156, at 482 (describing methods of “functional” entrenchment
involving the “strengthening political allies or weakening political opponents,” “changing the
composition of the political community,” and “empowering a different governmental institution and
consequently a different set of political actors and groups”); Magill, supra note 39, at 894 (noting that
agency heads “could empower an internal agency unit with predictable views to be in charge of the
agency choice,” thus rendering it “more difficult for political opponents to oppose the effort or to
dislodge it once it is in place”).
307
See SEAN GAILMARD & JOHN PATTY, LEARNING WHILE GOVERNING 25-27 (2013); Matthew C.
Stephenson, Information Acquisition and Institutional Design, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1423, 1422-27
(2011).
308
See, e.g., Philippe Aghion & Jean Tirole, Formal and Real Authority in Organizations, 105 J. POL.
ECON. 1, 3 (1997) (observing that the “transfer of formal authority to an agent credibly increases the
agent’s initiative or incentive to acquire information”); Ryan Bubb & Patrick Warren, Optimal Agency
Bias and Regulatory Review, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 95 (2014); Stephenson, supra note.
309
Cf. Margaret Lemos, The Consequences of Congress’s Choice of Delegate, 63 VAND. L. REV. 363,
372-73 (2010); (similar rationale for why Congress grants discretion to agencies); Daron Acemoglu, et
al., Technology, Information, and the Decentralization of the Firm, 4 Q. J. ECON. 1759 (2007) (similar
rationale for why managers delegate to employees); Thomas Gilligan & Keith Krehbiel, Collective
Decisionmaking and Standing Committees, 3 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 287 (1987) (similar rationale for why
Congress limits its own ability to amend its committees’ proposals).
310
See Sean Gailmard & John Patty, Slackers and Zealots: Civil Service, Policy Discretion, and
Bureaucratic Expertise, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 873 (2007).
306
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growth.311 Finally, subdelegation can also free up resources for political appointees to
pursue higher-priority tasks. By declining decision-making authority, agency heads
can focus more time and attention on more important matters.312
***
To summarize, submerged independent agencies can foster expertise and
generate higher-quality decision-making. But they also may yield less democratically
responsive policies. Accountability is weakened both to the extent that civil servants’
preferences differ from the views of politically accountable appointees and to the
extent that current appointees subdelegate to entrench their preferences and constrain
future appointees. How one weighs these competing considerations may vary by
agency or policy issue, or even by diverging first principles about constitutional and
administrative law. There are also difficult empirical questions that must be resolved
before deciding whether submerged independent agencies are, on net, desirable for the
administrative state.

C. Oversight
Given the competing values that submerged independent agencies serve, an
important question is which institutional actor is best situated to evaluate this tradeoff.
At first glance, it might be tempting to call upon judicial actors to resolve the
competing concerns in fact-specific circumstances. Perhaps courts could police
partisan entrenchment through the Accardi doctrine, which, recall, compels agencies
to follow their own rules. In this view, a judge could refuse to enforce rules delegating
authority if a litigant can convincingly show evidence that partisan entrenchment
motivated the subdelegation.
A well-developed literature in the election-law context, however, suggests that
political actors may be better equipped than judges to police against entrenchment.313
311

Jacob Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Delegating to Enemies, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 2193, 2223 (2012);
Douglass North & Barry Weingast, Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutional
Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 803, 819 (1989)
312
See James P. Pfiffner, Political Appointees and Career Executives: The Democracy-Bureaucracy
Nexus in the Third Century, 47 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 57, 62 (1987) (arguing that a certain level of
subdelegations to civil servants may improve agency functioning and, thus, better enable the agency
to achieve appointee objectives).
313
See Heather Gerken, Lost in the Political Thicket: The Court, Election Law, and the Doctrinal
Interregnum, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 503, 517–18 (2004) (“Lacking a sound framework for adjudicating
political process claims, the Supreme Court’s election law opinions often lack analytic coherence and
thus provide little guidance to lower courts or other political actors.”); Samuel Issacharoff,
Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV. 593, 630–45 (2002) (discussing the Supreme
Court’s “constitutional entanglement” with the redistricting process and “intrusi[ons] into state political
arrangements”); Samuel Issacharoff & Richard Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the
Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 644–45 (1998) (criticizing the Supreme Court’s failure to
“articulate a . . . highly functional account of what features of democratic politics should be the focus
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To start, entrenchment does not admit to an obvious judicially manageable standard.314
The concept of raising the costs of repeal or amendment, for example, raises normative
baseline questions. For instance, how many allies created as a result of the delegation
is too many? How much greater must the marginal costs of repeal be to qualify as too
much? Such questions also require difficult inquiries regarding mixed motives: Did
the agency head intend to entrench power or merely motivate internal expertise?315 For
these reasons, along with more familiar separation-of-power concerns, courts have
historically been deferential to agency heads’ judgments of how to manage their
internal resources and affairs, especially when such decisions are not fixed by
statute.316
Political actors, by contrast, have tools as well as stronger incentives to root out
delegations to internal agency actors that are no longer aligned with current
preferences. The subdelegations that we study here are all published in the Federal
Register and the Code of Federal Regulations. But publication by itself is often
insufficient to garner limited presidential or legislative attention.317 To increase the
salience of subdelegations, Congress should consider requiring agencies to submit
existing internal delegations after presidential and congressional transitions to the
relevant congressional committees or the Government Accountability Office.
Similarly, new Presidents-elect should review these delegations as part of transition
planning.
Both the legislature and executive branch should consider implementing ex post
review mechanisms akin to the Congressional Review Act and OIRA review. Both of
these mechanisms require agencies to affirmatively bring certain actions to the
attention of political actors. A similar congressional or White House mechanism for
proposed subdelegations could help to ensure that accountable actors consider the
appropriate tradeoffs that each delegation presents. The overarching idea of these
processes would be to review the scope of delegated authority as well as the exercise
of authority pursuant to them
Finally, Congress or the President could go even further by passing legislation
or drafting an executive order automatically sunsetting all internal agency
subdelegations — thereby requiring incoming agency heads to affirmatively review
of constitutional analysis”).
314
See Nathaniel Persily, The Place of Competition in American Election Law, in The Marketplace of
Democracy: Electoral Competition and American Politics 171, 172–74 (Michael McDonald & John
Samples eds., 2006) (noting “[d]ifferent election laws will have different competition-related effects,
and maximizing competitiveness along one dimension might diminish it on another”).
315
See Michael Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85 GEO. L.J. 491,
542 (1997) (“Even if one agrees that entrenchment problems have significant antimajoritarian
implications and that they are not sufficiently self-correcting, one still might reject an anti-entrenchment
theory of judicial review if the task it prescribes for courts is unmanageable.”).
316
See Gillian Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to Supervise, 124 YALE L.J. 1836, 1872 (2015) (citing
Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 891 (1990) ((stating that individuals “cannot seek
wholesale improvement of this program by court decree, rather than in the offices of the Department or
the halls of Congress, where programmatic improvements are normally mad”))).
317
Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885, 896–99 (2006).

60

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4023822

and ratify them. Such measures would help to ensure that subdelegations to lowerlevel officials do not persist due to inertia and simple path dependence. The major
drawbacks to this approach, however, are that it could result in the revocation of
socially beneficial subdelegations and could have a chilling effect on the exercise of
delegated authority.

CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that an unrecognized form of independent agency is
ensconced within the administrative state. These entities exercise discretionary
governmental authority. They are headed by civil servants possessing removal
protection and subject to varying degrees of political control. Their authority can be
judicially enforceable. It is often exercised under the radar due to information costs
and resource constraints on the political appointee above.
Our empirical findings suggest that submerged independent agencies have
been created by Republican and Democratic administrations alike across a variety of
agencies. The practice is pervasive, particularly during the midnight period. Partisan
differences in overall behavior are not obvious, though perhaps unsurprisingly, there
are differences in subject matter. An important limitation on our analysis is that it
necessarily relies on subdelegation counts as a proxy for magnitude and significance.
But of course, two different delegations can vary along both dimensions. Thus, future
work should attempt to formulate alternative measures of a delegation’s scope and
salience as a validity check and basis of further illumination.
Many questions remain for the research agenda established and motivated by
our descriptive findings and dataset. Among them is the important question of what
factors inform an appointee’s choice to delegate to a civil servant relative to a political
appointee. Does it vary according to the level of expertise required or perceived
preference alignment? Another question is what influences a delegator’s choice of
form: When does it make sense to publish the subdelegation in the CFR versus an
internal manual or not at all? Does it depend on the monitoring environment, the
number of interest groups engaged on an issue, or other factors? Further, in light of
our findings concerning presidential transitions and party control of Congress, more
fine-grained work remains concerning the political circumstances under which
subdelegations occur; for instance, do we observe heightened activity preceding
congressional transitions?318 Finally, more work should be done to understand what
kinds of actions are taken by civil servants pursuant to these subdelegations.
Independent agencies are already in the judicial crosshairs. Those identified
here are unlikely to be an exception. The heated rhetoric over this administrative form,
however, should be tempered by more careful consideration of their costs and benefits.
Executive branch actors have been creating submerged independent agencies for
Cf. Anne Joseph O’Connell, Agency Rulemaking and Political Transitions, 105 NW. L. REV. 471,
503 (2011) (finding that agencies “rush to complete rules before a change in control of Congress”).
318
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decades, suggesting that they serve an important function and perceived need.
Accordingly, our hope is that the future of submerged independent agencies will
depend not on soundbites, but rather on careful empirical work to better understand
the motivations and consequences of the phenomenon.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A: Delegator and Delegatee Characteristics
To provide a more comprehensive overview on our new subdelegations
dataset, the following two tables report information on the identities of the delegators
and delegatees. For the delegatee table, the pool expands from appointees and civil
servants to include other governmental actors: states and other subnational government
entities, other federal agencies, and inspectors general.319
Table A.1 : Delegator Characteristics

Appointees

Total

Mean /
Year
(SD)

Median /
Year
(MAD)

3,292

80.3
(71.1)
67.9
(65.8)
12.4
(13.1)
1.6
(2.8)

68.0
(60.8)
57.0
(50.4)
8.0
(7.4)
1.0
(1.5)

PAS Appointees

2,783

Other Appointees

509

Civil Servants

66

Mean /
AgencyYr
(SD)
9.2
(21.7)
8.9
(22.6)
8.6
(10.4)
1.3
(1.7)

Median /
Agency-Yr
(MAD)
3.0
(3.0)
3.0
(3.0)
5.0
(5.9)
1.0
(1.5)

Some values are slightly higher than the total number of civil servant-to-appointee and civil servant-to-civil
servant delegations reported in Table 1 because the identities of some delegatees are unknown. Figure
includes one delegation from the USDA’s inspector general, a PAS appointee who is nonetheless considered
independent of other appointees within the departmental hierarchy. Other appointees category includes
presidential appointments not requiring Senate confirmation, noncareer appointments, Schedule C
appointees, and appointments excepted by statute. Civil servants category includes career appointments,
positions not listed the most recent Plum Book published prior to the relevant delegation, and military
officers (excluding those listed in the Plum Book).

319

Although inspectors general are PAS appointees, they enjoy a measure of operational and budgetary
autonomy from other agency officials. See Robin Kempf and Jessica Cabrera, The De Facto
Independence of Federal Offices of Inspector General, 49 AM. REV. PUB. ADMIN. 65, 67 (2019). An
inspector general is delegator concerning one subdelegation in our dataset.
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Table A.2 : Delegatee Characteristics
Total

Appointees

1,128

PAS Appointees

705

Other Appointees

423

Inspectors General

21

Civil Servants

1,621

Article I Judges
State, Local, & Tribal
Govt
Other Fed. Agencies

8
467
29

Mean /
Year
(SD)
26.9
(27.3)
16.8
(20.6)
10.1
(17.3)
0.5
(1.4)
40.5
(49.7)
0.19
(0.46)
11.4
(12.3)
0.7
(1.4)
(1.71)

Median /
Year
(MAD)
17.5
(17.1)
11.5
(12.6)
4.0
(4.4)
0
28.0
(32.6)
0
8.0
(7.4)
0

Mean /
Agency-Yr
(SD)
6.6
(14.5)
5.5
(11.9)
5.0
(11.6)
0.5
(1.2)
6.5
(16.7)
0.002
(0.05)
10.4
(12.0)
0.7
(1.2)

Median /
Agency-Yr
(MAD)
2.0
(1.5)
2.0
(1.5)
1.5
(0.7)
0
2
(1.5)
0
6.0
(7.4)
0

Notes: Some values are slightly higher than the total number of appointee-to-appointee and civil servantto-appointee delegations reported in Table 1 because the identities of some delegatees are unknown. Other
appointees category includes presidential appointments not requiring Senate confirmation, noncareer
appointments, Schedule C appointees, and appointments excepted by statute. Inspectors general are a subset
of PAS appointees. See supra note 319. Civil servants category includes career appointments, positions not
listed the most recent Plum Book published prior to the relevant delegation, and military officers (excluding
those listed in the Plum Book). Values are slightly higher than the total number of appointee-to-civil servant
and civil servant-to-civil servant delegations reported in Table 1 because the identities of several delegators
are unknown. Article I Judges includes six subdelegations administrative law judges (ALJs) and two
subdelegations to the Justice Department’s Chief Immigration Judge. Immigration Judges, along with some
other types of judges within the executive branch, are legally distinct from ALJs. See Kent Barnett & Russell
Wheeler, Non-ALJ Adjudicators in Federal Agencies, 53 GA. L. REV. 1 (2018).

Within the largest of these new categories, intergovernmental subdelegations,
all but four of the 467 are EPA conveyances to states and other subnational units to
implement two pollution-control standards under the Clean Air Act.320 A majority of
interagency subdelegations involve either the DOJ assigning the ability to respond to
legal claims to the targeted agency or the General Services Administration authorizing
other agencies to undertake certain leasing and procurement decisions.321

320

For an example of one such EPA intergovernmental delegation, see 66 Fed. Reg. 48211-01 (Sept.
19, 2001)
321
73 Fed. Reg. 70278-01 (Nov. 20, 2008) (DOJ delegation to Secretary of Veterans Affairs to settle
administrative torts claims for up to $300,000); 58 Fed. Reg. 40592-01 (July 29, 1993) (GSA expansion
of delegated authority for other agencies to lease space in private buildings).
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Appendix B: Frequent Topics of Subdelegations
As discussed in Part II.B, we use structural topic modeling to gain insights into
which concepts tend to be grouped to together in the text of subdelegations. Figure
B.1 illustrates differences in the prevalence of each topic in each presidential
administration, from Carter to Trump, relative to its prevalence in the other
administrations during our study period. For instance, the first bar in the figure shows
that food-and-drug-related subdelegations (Topic 2) are 3.7 percent less common
during the Clinton administration than in other administrations during the 1979-2019
period. For simplicity, the figure only displaces differences in topic prevalence that
are statistically significant at the p < 0.05 level.
Figure B.1: Difference in Topic Prevalence by Presidency
Motor Vehicles (Topic 1)
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The most notable feature of the figure is the substantially greater prevalence of
subdelegations concerning rural utility lending (Topic 11) during the Clinton
administration, and corresponding substantially lower prevalence in many other
administrations. This result is almost entirely attributable to a single Federal Register
entry in 1994; as discussed supra Part II, this outlier entry subdelegated dozens of
discrete powers within the REA.
65

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4023822

